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## THESIS

**UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT: WILL AMERICA'S  
DEDICATED CSAR FORCES FINALLY THRIVE IN  
AFSOC?**

by

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December 2004

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**UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT: WILL AMERICA'S DEDICATED CSAR  
FORCES FINALLY THRIVE IN AFSOC?**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
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## **ABSTRACT**

On 1 October 2003 the USAF transferred control of its CONUS-based combat search and rescue (CSAR) assets from Air Combat Command to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Transfer to AFSOC was CSAR's fourth major reorganization in twenty years, and was the latest in a turbulent procession of attempts to improve the combat effectiveness of CSAR forces. Despite possessing an abundance of brave, motivated, and extremely capable personnel yearning to accomplish their mission, dysfunctional organizational arrays and nagging organizational constraints have prevented USAF dedicated CSAR forces from "getting to the fight" for the onset of hostilities in three of this nation's past four major armed conflicts. Special operations forces had to fill the void. This analysis evaluates CSAR's position within AFSOC's organizational array to determine if this latest reorganization is likely to produce durable improvements in CSAR combat effectiveness. My conclusion is that "CSAR friendly" organizational culture and effective organizational constructs within AFSOC Headquarters, combined with highly receptive attitudes among CSAR crewmembers, form a historically unique organizational mix that favors the long term success of CSAR forces in AFSOC. To ensure AFSOC's favorable organizational posture is translated to improved combat capability, leadership must immediately increase CSAR representation on HHQ staffs.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACC	Air Combat Command
ADCON	Administrative Control
AEF	Aerospace Expeditionary Force
AETC	Air Education and Training Command
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
AFSOF	Air Force Special Operations Forces
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AMP	Avionics Modernization Program
ARRS	Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service
ARS	Air Rescue Service
CAAP	Combined Avionics Architecture for Penetration
CENTAF	Central Command Air Forces
CINC	Commander in Chief
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONUS	Continental United States
CSAF	Chief of Staff of the Air Force
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
DOD	Department of Defense
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HHQ	Higher Headquarters
IPT	Integrated Process Team
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC	Joint Forces Air Component Commander
JFSOCC	Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAJCOM	Major Command
NSC	National Security Council
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPCON	Operational Control
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PAD	Program Action Directive
PR	Personnel Recovery
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SECAF	Secretary of the Air Force
SOCENT	Special Operations Command Central
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SPP	Strategic Planning Process
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TACON	Tactical Control
TF	Terrain-Following
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command (also SOCOM)

## I. INTRODUCTION

Combat search and rescue (CSAR) is a vital strategic military function in the U.S. armed forces that embodies the profound value our nation places on individual human lives while it attempts to deny our enemies the opportunity to exploit isolated personnel. On 1 October 2003 control of all USAF CONUS-based dedicated CSAR assets was transferred from Air Combat Command (ACC) to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Transfer to AFSOC was CSAR's fourth major reorganization in twenty years and was the latest in a turbulent procession of attempts to improve the combat effectiveness of dedicated CSAR forces.

### A. SCOPE

This study evaluates the long-term prospects for improving the combat effectiveness of Air Force combat search and rescue units in light of their recent transfer from ACC to AFSOC. In order to frame my analysis, it is necessary to first present the doctrinal concept of CSAR in the context of its contribution to overall U.S. Personnel Recovery efforts.

Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 2310.2 (2000) establishes U.S. policy for personnel recovery and states:

Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DOD civilian and contract service employees placed in danger of being isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured, or having to evade while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the DOD. The DOD has a moral obligation to protect its personnel, prevent exploitation of its personnel by adversaries, and reduce the potential for captured personnel being used as leverage against the U.S. (p. 3)

From this guidance, U.S. Joint Doctrine defines Personnel Recovery (PR) as "The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and reintegration of U.S. military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel who are isolated or missing while participating in a U.S.-sponsored military activity or mission" (U.S. Joint Chiefs, 2004, p. I-1). The latest draft of Joint Pub 3-50, Joint

Doctrine for Personnel Recovery, further explains that with specific approval from the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. PR efforts can be extended to “other governments, agencies, organizations, and individuals” (U.S. Joint Chiefs, 2004, p. I-1).

Joint Doctrine further assigns specific CSAR roles to each of the services and USSOCOM under the broad umbrella of PR (U.S. Joint Chiefs, 1996, p. I-1). CSAR is the central military contribution to overall U.S. Personnel Recovery capacity. Joint Pub 3-50 defines CSAR as, “A specific task performed by recovery forces to effect the recovery of isolated personnel during war or military operations other than war” (U.S. Joint Chiefs, 2004, p. GL-9). Credible CSAR capability enhances the effectiveness of other PR efforts, and the Air Force is the only service that fields specialized units completely dedicated to the CSAR mission.

The bulk of this study focuses exclusively on the specific USAF dedicated CSAR units that were transferred to Air Force Special Operations Command on 1 October 2003. These units are delineated in Figure 1 below. In Chapter II, I use the term “CSAR” in reference to the general capability that was needed in order to begin initial combat operations in Afghanistan. In Chapter III, I use the term “CSAR” in a generic historical sense, referring to all units contained in the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) and its organizational successors. Throughout the remainder of the study, I use the terms “CSAR”, “CSAR forces”, and “dedicated CSAR forces” in specific reference to the AFSOC-gained units affected by the 1 October 2003 transfer and/or the capability they provide within the context of the overall U.S. Personnel Recovery system. Again, my ultimate goal is to evaluate the long-term prospects for improving the combat effectiveness (in terms of availability and capability) of these particular CSAR units in light of their recent transfer from ACC to AFSOC.




Figure 1. CSAR Units Transferred to AFSOC on 1 October 2003

## B. BACKGROUND / RELEVANCE

Brigadier General Thomas Dubose, Commander of Air Rescue Service from 1952-1959, uttered a timeless phrase about the commitment of the U.S. military to recover its own who become stranded behind enemy lines:

To me it has always been a source of wonder and pride that the most potent and destructive military force ever known should create a special service dedicated to saving a life. Its concept is typically American – we hold human lives to be the most precious commodity on earth. (Thompson, 2001, p. 41)

As mentioned above, CSAR is at the doctrinal heart of overall U.S. Personnel Recovery policy. CSAR is a vital strategic function for the practical, psychological, and moral reasons quoted in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-6.1 (2000):

Successful Air Force CSAR enhances combat capability in three ways. [First], CSAR operations return key personnel to friendly control, allowing them to fight again. [Second], CSAR operations often influence the course of national and international politics by denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit the intelligence and propaganda value of captured personnel. [Third], the presence of a robust and viable CSAR force increases morale, with a resultant increase in operational performance. (p. 2)

Systemic budgetary neglect throughout the services has resulted in a general level of U.S. CSAR capability that falls far short of the “robust and viable” threshold set forth in Air Force Doctrine, Joint Doctrine, and DOD directives. The will of brave rescue personnel molded in the spirit of General Dubose’s remarks has never wavered over the years. However, poor organizational design and a lack of up to date tools has prevented the emergence of a supremely effective CSAR capability worthy of our great nation.

On the organizational front, control of USAF dedicated CSAR forces has been passed around like a “hot potato” since the end of the Vietnam War. As a result, Air Force CSAR has not gained enough traction and high-level advocacy within its ever-changing parent organizations to leverage the resources necessary to be truly effective on the modern battlefield. Despite possessing an abundance of extraordinarily brave, highly motivated, and extremely capable personnel eager to get the job done, dysfunctional organizational arrays and nagging organizational constraints have prevented USAF dedicated CSAR forces from “getting to the fight” for the onset of hostilities in three of this nation’s past four major armed conflicts (Thompson, 2001, p. 27, 39). Consequently, special operations forces (SOF) forces have routinely been called in to shoulder the CSAR load.

The fact that SOF forces have been successful in conducting rescues from within enemy territory has proven a mixed blessing. Although producing significant short-term results, using SOF for CSAR missions devastates the morale of brave and willing aircrews in dedicated CSAR units, while invalidating the considerable (but incomplete) resources invested in their aircraft and training.

Furthermore, over-reliance on SOF for CSAR pulls their valuable assets away from other sensitive missions, decreasing the long-term readiness of SOF.

Recently a key initiative was undertaken to address these systemic problems in CSAR readiness and capability. In Air Force CSAR's fourth major reorganization in twenty years, the USAF transferred control of all its CONUS-based CSAR assets from Air Combat Command to Air Force Special Operations Command on 1 October 2003. For the second time in a generation, Air Force SOF (AFSOF) and Air Force CSAR forces now are united under the same major command (MAJCOM). As described in the next chapter, the previous marriage between AFSOF and CSAR was a rocky one that ended in an ugly divorce.

In the wake of the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt, an urgent buildup of SOF was accomplished at the direct expense of CSAR forces. As a result of the infamous (from the CSAR perspective) "Forward Look" study, AFSOF was given all of the Air Force's most capable HH-53s and active-duty HC-130s, effectively gutting CSAR's real combat recovery capability (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 22). Adding insult to injury, all of these critical assets stayed with AFSOF when they were separated from CSAR and moved to the newly-formed AFSOC under United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM). CSAR forces that remained in the USAF's Military Airlift Command (MAC) were literally devoid of effective combat recovery capability for nearly ten years until they finally won multiple budgetary battles to field the HH-60G helicopter.

## C. PURPOSE

Despite the troubles in AFSOF and CSAR's shared past, our nation has now turned to AFSOC to shape an enduringly effective dedicated CSAR force. AFSOC ownership of CSAR brings the AFSOC Commander and his staff to the table as potentially powerful new CSAR advocates. AFSOC's challenge is to ensure this most recent reorganization of CSAR does not become just the latest in a long line of futile attempts at improving Air Force CSAR capability. This analysis looks at CSAR's specific position within AFSOC's organizational array to determine if the recent organizational re-alignment is likely to result in durable improvements in CSAR combat effectiveness.

Three major findings align to support my conclusion that CASR forces are poised for long-term success in AFSOC. First, a recent shift from a platform-based outlook to a more capabilities-based outlook within AFSOC Headquarters has greatly diminished a historically unhealthy level of platform-based parochialism, resulting in a “CSAR friendly” organizational culture. Second, effective organizational constructs within AFSOC Headquarters, especially those regarding resource allocation and higher headquarters (HHQ) advocacy, result in good role alignment between AFSOF and CSAR forces. This mitigates and minimizes many of the textbook difficulties faced by large organizations undertaking great change. Third, a survey I conducted of newly-integrated CSAR crewmembers reveals highly receptive attitudes towards re-alignment under AFSOC. Most CSAR “crew dogs” think AFSOC is a better advocate for CSAR than ACC, and believe the transfer will eventually bring about increased combat effectiveness in their units. In general, aircrews are happy with the transfer and really want it to work. In total, these findings illuminate a historically unique mix of organizational relationships that allow for long-term improvements in the combat capability of CSAR forces in AFSOC without threatening or negatively affecting the combat readiness of AFSOF.

#### **D. METHODOLOGY**

The research methods I employ include the use of primary and secondary literature, incorporation of participant observation and personal experience, interviews, survey research, and case study analysis where appropriate to address key issues.

Chapter II presents a brief case study of the critical CSAR issues involved in enabling initial U.S. combat actions in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. The case study provides an anchor point for further discussion of general CSAR issues while also accomplishing two specific goals. First, it demonstrates the key strategic role the availability of CSAR forces plays in overall U.S. policy deliberations over the use of force. Second, it vividly

illustrates the organizational shortcomings of CSAR forces as they were constituted in Air Combat Command that initiated their eventual transfer to AFSOC.

Chapter III depicts CSAR's turbulent organizational history in two phases. In the first phase, I describe the organizational constraints that hindered CSAR's role in our nation's last four major conflicts: Desert Storm, Allied Force, OEF, and OIF. In the second phase, I present a chronological record of CSAR's formal organizational history since the end of the Vietnam War. All of my data for this chapter was combed from pertinent primary and secondary written sources. This historical perspective, which highlights three previous major reorganizations where CSAR forces were either shifted to a different MAJCOM or combined with/separated from AFSOF, provides a richly textured backdrop to my evaluation of the prospects for CSAR's long-term success in its most recent reorganization under AFSOC.

Chapter IV evaluates the current state of CSAR in AFSOC's cultural array in order to help forecast the long-term prospects for improved CSAR combat effectiveness. I apply tenets of organizational theory to historical data gained from participant observation/personal experience during my previous tour on the AFSOC staff, and to recent data gained from interviews of current AFSOC leaders and staff members. In this chapter, I contend that changes in AFSOC's task environment stemming from its role in the global war on terrorism (GWOT) have driven the command away from an insular platform-based culture and towards a more open-minded capabilities-based culture. I use a case study about the final resolution of a ten-year bureaucratic battle between parochial interests in AFSOC over funding for terrain following radar on the MC-130P Combat Shadow as an illustration of this shift in organizational culture. I conclude the general mitigation of traditional clannish parochialism in AFSOC Headquarters results in a "CSAR-friendly" organizational culture and work environment that favors CSAR's long-term success in the command.

Chapter V evaluates the current state of CSAR in AFSOC's structural array in order to help forecast the long-term prospects for improved CSAR combat effectiveness. As in Chapter IV, I apply tenets of organizational theory to historical data gained from participant observation/personal experience during my previous tour on the AFSOC staff, and to recent data gained from interviews of current AFSOC leaders and staff members. In this chapter I analyze the key structural elements of AFSOC Headquarters as they relate to the production and advocacy of CSAR forces. I contend that effective organizational constructs within AFSOC Headquarters, especially those regarding resource allocation and higher headquarters (HHQ) advocacy, result in good role alignment between AFSOF and CSAR forces. I conclude that this minimizes many of the textbook difficulties faced by large organizations undertaking great change, and therefore this also favors CSAR's long-term success in AFSOC.

Chapter VI employs survey research of current CSAR line aircrew members to validate my findings from Chapters IV and V. I made the survey aircrew oriented not as a slight to the crucial pararescue community, but only as a method to "stay in my lane" with a narrow enough focus to keep the length of this project manageable. I intended to sample the entire universe of line CSAR aircrews, but coordination delays with Reserve and Guard chains of command resulted in my receiving primarily an Active Duty perspective. The survey captured a vast amount of information covering broad areas that ended up outside the scope of this study. I ended up conducting extensive statistical analysis on responses to Section 3 of the survey, and further informing that analysis with selected general comments captured in Section 4 of the survey. The complete survey, and an explanation of the academic basis of its construction, is contained in Appendix A.

Chapter VII contains my conclusions and recommendations. Overall, AFSOC Headquarters contains a historically unique set of stable, durable organizational traits that favor the long-term improvement of CSAR forces' combat effectiveness. My analysis of the resource allocation structure in AFSOC identifies key avenues for CSAR advocacy that can be exploited by powerful new

stakeholders without detriment to AFSOF funding priorities. My survey research reveals CSAR crews enthusiastically support the transfer and have taken a practical and patient “long view” towards AFSOC being able to correct CSAR’s most deeply rooted shortcomings. Thus, I contend the organizational table is set for CSAR to be successful.

The key variable in translating AFSOC’s favorable organizational posture into tangible improvements in CSAR combat capability is the level to which high ranking AFSOC leadership will be effective as enthusiastic CSAR advocates in winning resource battles within the USAF budget process. In order to prove their bona fides as aggressive CSAR advocates, AFSOC’s current leadership should heed a call from the field to immediately bolster the CSAR positions on HHQ staffs. This will correct huge cuts in HHQ manpower positions suffered by CSAR when they left ACC, and will set AFSOC Headquarters up for sustainable CSAR support. AFSOC’s urgent best effort to improve CSAR effectiveness is essential in order to keep faith with our fellow warriors as they continue to go in harm’s way to confront our nation’s enemies in the GWOT.

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## **II. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM CSAR CASE STUDY**

A brief case study of CSAR issues from Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan provides a compelling anchor point for further discussion about CSAR issues in general. This case study simultaneously accomplishes two goals. First, it bolsters my contention that CSAR capability is a vital strategic national resource in its own right. Second, it vividly illustrates the organizational shortcomings of dedicated CSAR forces as they were constituted in Air Combat Command. A realization of these two points by senior Air Force leaders in the wake of the opening salvos of OEF in Afghanistan fueled their decision to transfer CSAR forces to AFSOC in 2003.

### **A. OEF ILLUSTRATES CSAR IS A STRATEGICALLY VITAL NATIONAL RESOURCE**

A look at the preparations for initial OEF combat action in Afghanistan dramatically illustrates that the availability of CSAR capability plays a profound role at the highest levels in our nation's deliberations on the use of military force. For a brief, critical period from 11 September through 8 October 2001, CSAR was a central, defining pivot point for overall U.S. foreign policy. Bob Woodward (2002) captures the issue as follows:

The problem was that bin Laden and the network were virtually untouched in their sanctuary 15 days after the attacks. For many days the war cabinet had been dancing around the basic question: How long could they wait after September 11 before the U.S. started going "kinetic," as they often termed it, against al Qaeda in a visible way? The public was patient, at least it seemed patient, but everyone wanted action. A full military operation – air and boots [on the ground] – would be the essential demonstration of seriousness – to bin Laden, America, and the world. The President took the floor... "Are we ready to begin next week?" President Bush pressed. "The [regional] CINC will be ready by then," [JCS Chairman] General Shelton said, "But the issue is CSAR"... CSAR was the lifeline for those who flew combat missions and there was a presumption that the military brass would go all out to ensure it was in place. This was not only because of the lives of the pilots and crew. Any downed airman behind enemy lines is a potential hostage. Anyone who had lived through hostage crises, from the 52 Americans held in Tehran during 1979-1980 to those held in

Lebanon in the mid-1980s, knew the potential impact of American hostages on [U.S.] foreign policy. (p. 150, 152)

This point about the importance of CSAR resonated particularly well with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. She believed there were only a few ways to make a really big mistake in the opening phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, and “a captured pilot was one of them” (Woodward, 2002, p. 178). It wasn’t just memories of Carter’s hostages in Iran or Reagan’s in Lebanon, it was that “bin Laden or al Qaeda with American hostages would change the terms of the debate and give them immense leverage” (Woodward, 2002, p. 178-179).

Frantic diplomatic efforts were underway to secure CSAR basing rights in Uzbekistan. At a National Security Council (NSC) meeting on 28 September 2001 President Bush asked, “If the Uzbeks say no, what’s the plan?” (Woodward, 2002, p. 164). Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld replied, “If we have no CSAR in the north you can’t have air operations in the north, just in the south” (Woodward, 2002, p. 164). To CIA Director George Tenet, this limitation on airstrikes due to lack of CSAR put the entire campaign plan in jeopardy:

Tenet’s main action [with SOF and paramilitary teams] was in the North. He had little to none in the South. Now it looked like the bombing was going to have the exact opposite emphasis – none in the north, only in the south. It would be a total mismatch. (Woodward, 2002, p. 164)

Thus, the initial military response to the 9/11 attacks, and therefore the beginning of the military phase of the larger GWOT, became wholly contingent upon getting adequate CSAR coverage for planned airstrikes in support of Special Forces and CIA paramilitary teams operating in northern Afghanistan. Knowing that further delays “were not going to be acceptable to the President”, Rice commented in a September 30<sup>th</sup> side meeting that the lack of CSAR coverage “may delay air operations up to 12 days if we can’t mitigate this in some sense,” (Woodward, 2002, p. 178-179). In response to Rice’s (and the President’s) concerns, Woodward (2002) describes how Secretary Rumsfeld considered launching operations without CSAR coverage, but was unhappy with the targets:

For this value of targets”, Rumsfeld said, I wouldn’t go in without CSAR.” To lose a pilot for these low-value fixed and mud-hut-type targets made no sense. For a really high-value target, yes, he might consider the risk. Not for these. (p. 179)

Fortunately, Herculean diplomatic efforts with Uzbekistan began paying off within the next several days. At the NSC meeting on Thursday, October 4<sup>th</sup> new JCS Chairman General Richard Meyers reported that site surveys and airfield analysis had progressed well in the wake of diplomatic breakthroughs, and said that, “CSAR in the north will be stood up by Monday in Uzbekistan” (Woodward, 2002, p. 195). With this final hurdle to the beginning of hostilities finally cleared, all that was left was final approval from the President. In the Saturday, October 6<sup>th</sup> NSC meeting SECDEF Rumsfeld told the President, “We need a ‘go’ for the operation,” because the B-2 stealth bombers that were conducting the initial strikes in Afghanistan were being employed directly from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, and would need to leave 15 or more hours in advance (Woodward, 2002, p. 204). President Bush said, “Go. It’s well thought through. It’s the right thing to do” (Woodward, 2002, p. 204).

Three and a half tense weeks after the 9/11 attacks, as U.S. CSAR capability raced into Uzbekistan from forward staging bases in Germany and Turkey, President Bush revealed the fruits of all the U.S. government’s frantic behind-the-scenes diplomatic and military efforts to the American people. On Sunday, October 7<sup>th</sup> at 1 PM Eastern, the President made an address to the nation. He said:

On my orders the United States military has begun strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan...Our military action is designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them [the terrorists] out and bring them to justice...[To the men and women of the military], your mission is defined; your objectives are clear; your goal is just; you have my full confidence; *and you have every tool you need to carry out your duty* [emphasis mine]. (Woodward, 2002, p. 209)

## **B. SOF FILLS THE CSAR GAP**

The one key fact that Woodward does not capture in all of his descriptions of the intense efforts expended to get CSAR coverage of northern Afghanistan is that the actual combat forces that arrived in Uzbekistan to provide the capability were Special Operations Command Central (SOCENT)-apportioned Air Force and Army SOF assets, not Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF)-apportioned dedicated CSAR assets (Herbert, 2003, p. 3). As detailed in the following chapter, various organizational constraints denied dedicated CSAR forces the ability to deploy and employ on the President's compressed timeline. This shortfall of CSAR duties to SOF continued a disturbing historical pattern of CSAR forces being unable to provide their vital services when it really mattered, where it really mattered.

The trend of SOF having to fill CSAR requirements began in 1990 with Operation Desert Shield/Storm in Iraq and carried through 1999 in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo before its latest manifestation in 2001 during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In addition to describing the organizational constraints on dedicated CSAR forces that have caused this trend, the following chapter will also detail how this particular failure in OEF proved to be the “tipping point” that precipitated the 1 October 2003 transfer of CSAR forces to AFSOC that is the primary focus of this study.

### **III. HOT POTATO: CSAR'S TURBULENT ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY**

In this chapter, my goal is to provide a textured historical backdrop that adds context to my follow-on analysis of CSAR's recent organizational shift to AFSOC. I accomplish this goal in two phases. First, I present a discussion of the organizational constraints that prevented CSAR forces from effectively contributing timely capability in Operation Desert Storm, Operation Allied Force, and Operation Enduring Freedom. This demonstrates the historical trend of SOF having to fill gaps in CSAR capability and provides an effective lead-in for discussing the circumstances surrounding each of CSAR's four major reorganizations in the past 20 years. Second, I present a chronological record of CSAR's turbulent organizational history since the end of the Vietnam War. This chronology highlights three previous major reorganizations where CSAR forces were shifted to a different MAJCOM or combined with/separated from AFSOF. The sum of these two phases provides an overall historical perspective that further informs my primary evaluation of the prospects for CSAR's long-term success in its most recent reorganization under AFSOC.

#### **A. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS KEEP CSAR FROM THE FIGHT**

Despite possessing an abundance of extraordinarily brave, highly motivated, and extremely capable personnel eager to get their job done, dysfunctional organizational arrays and nagging organizational constraints have prevented USAF dedicated CSAR forces from "getting to the fight" for the onset of hostilities in three of this nation's past four major armed conflicts. Due to the various organizational constraints detailed below, CSAR forces were not utilized at all in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, or in the opening phases of Operations Allied Force and Enduring Freedom (Thompson, 2001, p. 27, 39). Only in Operation Iraqi Freedom were CSAR forces initially deployed as designed in a timely manner. However, they soon found themselves

improvising around their centralized Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) organizational design in order to forward deploy in small detachments to airfields deep inside Iraq.

### **1. Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm**

Operation Desert Storm over Iraq in 1991 found CSAR forces caught in transition. On the fixed-wing side, CSAR forces were still reeling from the drain of all of their active duty HC-130 aerial tankers to AFSOF in the newly formed Air Force Special Operations Command (Tyner, 1996, p. 28). On the rotary-winged side, having finally won a 10-year battle to get new helicopters after losing their prized HH-53Hs to AFSOF in 1980, CSAR helicopter squadrons were beginning the transition from obsolete UH-1s and HH-3s to new HH-60s (Thompson, 2001, p. 27). Thompson (2001) captures the extreme disparity that existed between CSAR and SOF rotary-winged capability at the onset of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in the following passage:

In August 1990, [CSAR] was in no position to contribute to the war effort. Only one [CSAR] squadron, the 38<sup>th</sup> Air Rescue Squadron at Osan AB, South Korea, had received HH-60Gs, and those four aircraft were committed to the Pacific theater. On the contrary, AFSOC contributed eight MH-60Gs and thirteen MH-53Js to the desert operation...The 160<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Aviation Regiment also sent MH-60L and MH-47 helicopters to Saudi Arabia, and these aircraft would provide secondary CSAR capability. (p. 27)

The overall result of CSAR's organizational pinch was that there simply were not any comprehensive dedicated CSAR force packages mission-ready and available for a combat deployment. Therefore, in a painful blow to the ethos of dedicated CSAR forces, General Schwarzkopf formally tasked SOCCENT to provide CSAR coverage for the entire desert air campaign (Thompson, 2001, p. 27).

### **2. Operation Allied Force**

Operation Allied Force over Kosovo in 1999 found CSAR forces reconstituted with HH-60s and more active-duty HC-130s, yet they were still "initially unavailable for deployment to the fight" (Thompson, 2001, p. 38). CSAR forces were spread thin covering CSAR requirements for northern and southern

no-fly zones in Iraq, to the point that they had already for years short fallen ongoing CSAR coverage for no-fly zones over Bosnia (Operation Deny Flight) to AFSOF (Bissonnette, 2002, p. 11). Therefore, “AFSOF was able to respond with an efficient CSAR force” from within its organic Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) concept when tasked to provide CSAR coverage for Operation Allied Force” (Bissonnette, 2002, p. 12). During combat operations over Serbia and Kosovo two aircraft, an F-117 and an F-16CJ, were lost to enemy fire. Both American pilots were successfully recovered from behind enemy lines by AFSOF (Bissonnette, 2002, p. 11). As Thompson (2001) says:

Operation Allied Force was yet another wake-up call for [dedicated] rescue assets. For the third time in the 1990s, [dedicated] rescue assets were on the sidelines as AFSOC forces were required to perform CSAR missions during combat operations [Desert Storm, Deny Flight (Ebro 33), and Kosovo] (p. 39)

### **3. Operation Enduring Freedom**

Representing another problem rooted in organizational array, in Operation Enduring Freedom dedicated CSAR forces were tied to large Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) packages for vital communications and logistical support. This left available CSAR forces organizationally unable to self-deploy to Afghanistan and effectively employ on the accelerated timeline required by the President in response to the 9/11 attacks. AEFs are specifically organized to deploy broad sets of offensive aerial capabilities in huge, interdependent packages. This makes each individual piece (like CSAR) non-self sufficient by design. OEF presented a type of urgent, singular CSAR requirement the “big blue” Air Force was simply not organized to handle. So yet once again, SOF assets provided the critical initial CSAR capability that allowed combat operations to commence in Afghanistan in accordance with the President’s timeline (Herbert, 2003, p. 1).

### **4. Operation Iraqi Freedom**

Demonstrating yet another organizational conundrum, in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) CSAR forces were initially able to deploy to the theater as designed with a large AEF package, but then they had to rapidly improvise

through forward deployments in small packages to forward operating locations (FOLs) inside Iraq. Many respondents to my survey lamented the ad-hoc nature of the communications and logistical support that they were forced to cobble together in order to effect the tactically crucial forward deployments. One survey respondent, an HH-60G helicopter pilot, captured this issue as follows:

Under ACC, CSAR forces had no capability to operate autonomously from forward or austere locations. Lack of communications and other organic capabilities caused severe problems at the outset of our operations in both OEF and OIF. Connectivity and having to rely on other forces for base operating support was a real thorn in the side for a while.

Once again, the “big blue” Air Force had not organized its CSAR forces in such a way as to make them responsive to the needs of the Joint Force Commander (JFC). In true “improvise, adapt, overcome” fashion, CSAR units persevered *despite* their organizational array, not *because* of it. In doing so, they exemplified the essential reality of the following statement about organizational dynamics from Air Force doctrine:

An optimum system is one where all of the parts work better because of the other parts. In broken systems, parts get work done in spite of the other parts. (U.S. Air Force, 2000, p. VI-1)

## B. CHRONOLOGY OF CSAR ORGANIZATIONAL TURBULENCE

With these previous operational breakdowns in mind, let us turn to the formal organizational history of CSAR forces. Figure 2 below graphically illustrates the turbulent organizational history CSAR forces over the last quarter century. The graphic also incorporates CSAR’s historical formal relationships with AFSOF. After first tracing the organizational relationships between AFSOF and CSAR forces through the Vietnam War and its aftermath, following paragraphs will expand on this graphic and provide details of the circumstances that drove each of the four major reorganizations CSAR has undergone in the last twenty years.




Figure 2. Organizational History of AFSOF and CSAR Forces

### 1. CSAR and AFSOF in Vietnam

Organizational friction is sometimes overcome by the sheer importance and urgency of the task at hand. Throughout the Vietnam War, AFSOF and CSAR forces collaborated very effectively despite belonging to separate organizations. AFSOF forces belonged to the Tactical Air Command's (TAC) 1<sup>st</sup> Special Operations Wing and CSAR forces belonged to Military Airlift Command's Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS), yet each made grand contributions to the other's primary missions in Vietnam. AFSOF A-1E "Sandy" escort aircraft integrated seamlessly with CSAR HH-3s, HH-53s, and HC-130s into comprehensive rescue packages. Their efforts resulted in the most dramatic and heroic combat rescue operations in history as they continuously took their slow, vulnerable aircraft into harm's way to rescue American pilots shot down behind enemy lines (Tilford, 1992, p. 72). CSAR units contributed "42

men, one HH-3, five HH-53s, and two HC-130s to assist SOF" in the daring Son Tay POW camp raid (Tyner, 1996, p. 22). AFSOF AC-130 gunships evolved into a rescue role while aiding CSAR HH-53s in an enterprising night rescue of two survivors from an AC-130 shot down along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in December 1972 (Tilford, 1992, p. 135-136).

## **2. CSAR and AFSOF Fight for Survival after Vietnam**

After the Vietnam War, the urgent combat necessity that had forced such effective CSAR and AFSOF collaboration evaporated. This left each organization to fend for itself in the brutal resource climate of the massive post-Vietnam military drawdown. Though both organizations suffered, CSAR did better maintaining itself under MAC than AFSOF did under TAC. In 1972 CSAR forces peaked at 5700 personnel and 355 aircraft. By 1976 CSAR units contained 4000 personnel and 214 aircraft (Tyner, 1996, p. 6). ARRS, whose units had made 2,780 combat saves, and whose 3<sup>rd</sup> Aerospace Rescue and Recovery (ARR) Group was one of the most decorated units in Southeast Asia, sought to maintain itself in the post-Vietnam drawdown by branching out into peacetime roles and missions. Tyner (1996) explains:

Rescue's largest flying squadron, the 37<sup>th</sup> Aerospace Rescue and Recovery (ARR) Squadron at Warren AFB, with all of its detachments, assumed the missile site security and support mission. The 71<sup>st</sup> ARR Squadron assumed the transportation and logistic support role for several remote sites in Alaska. The ARRS redesignated the 41<sup>st</sup> AAR Wing as the 41<sup>st</sup> Rescue and Weather Reconnaissance Wing because of its added Air Weather Service function. (p. 6-7)

AFSOF fared much worse in the post-Vietnam drawdown. Whitcomb (2003) captures the precipitous decline of AFSOF after Vietnam in his passage:

During the period of the Southeast Asia conflict, the Air Force special operations community had possessed 550 aircraft of all types and over 10,000 personnel. By 1979, the community had shrunk to 3,000 personnel with 28 aircraft. Most of these were assigned to the 1<sup>st</sup> Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, FL, or Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. Smaller units were located in Okinawa, Japan and Europe. Their fleet consisted of old CH-3, UH-1, MC-130 and AC-130 aircraft which, except for some of

the C-130 variants, were over 20 years old. Within TAC, the special operations units were the lowest priority in funding. (p. 16)

### **3. AFSOF Shortfalls Force Merger with CSAR**

#### **a. *Desert One Focuses Spotlight on AFSOF***

“On 24 April 1980, the pivotal event that would shape combat rescue in the Air Force over the remainder of the century took place: Operation Eagle Claw and the disaster at Desert One” (Thompson, 2001, p. 23). It is hard to overemphasize the impact the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt had on the organizational development of AFSOF and CSAR forces. The profound organizational effects of the disaster at the Desert One landing zone in the Iranian desert continue to ripple through AFSOF and CSAR force structure to this day.

The hostage rescue mission was aborted when several of the recovery helicopters broke down at an interim refueling site. Then a hovering RH-53 collided with an MC-130 aircraft as the helicopter tried to take off. The resulting explosion and fire were a horrible debacle. Eight U.S. servicemen were killed and the U.S. suffered a searing international foreign policy embarrassment the likes of which it had not experienced since the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba almost exactly 19 years earlier (Lenahan, 1998, p. 146-148).

Having withered on the vine in TAC’s fighter jet-oriented organizational array, AFSOF “showed a shocking lack of capability” in the failure at Desert One (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 17). Tyner (1996) captures the issue as follows:

In 1979, active duty Air Force special operations consisted of one wing, the 1<sup>st</sup> SOW, at Hurlburt Field, Florida and small MC-130 squadrons in Okinawa and Europe...The Air Force had no funding past 1990 for the proven [AC-130] gunship. The MC-130s were also “on the margins” of the USAF future program. AFSOF were on the verge of total collapse as their [post-Vietnam] downward trend continued. (p. 10)

Furthermore, AFSOF had no long range helicopter capability. Prior to the hostage rescue attempt, planners on the TAC staff had re-allocated all of

the 1<sup>st</sup> SOW's CH-53 heavy-lift helicopters to a non-SOF associated tactical communications unit (Kyle, 1990, p. 23). The hodge-podge combination of Navy aircraft with Marine pilots thrown together as a work around for Operation Eagle Claw had failed miserably. As one of the commanders of the ill fated mission stated afterward, "You cannot take a few people from one unit, throw them in with some from another, give them someone else's equipment and hope to come up with a top notch fighting outfit" (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 17).

In the wake of the Desert One tragedy, embarrassed Air Force leaders were desperate to find quick solutions to special operations equipment shortfalls. It didn't take long for them to zero in on the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service's new most prized possession: the HH-53H Pave Low III helicopter.

#### ***b. CSAR Loses the Pave Low***

Having diversified its missions and removed much of its focus from CSAR, ARRS had one big initiative going for combat rescue in the mid-1970s: the night and adverse weather capable HH-53H Pave Low III helicopter (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 15).

The Pave Low III was born from "Southwest Asia Operational Requirement 114, dated 3 April 1967, which stated the need for a combat recovery system for night and foul weather...The new helicopter was to be ARRS's "pride and joy: the most sophisticated helicopter in the world conceived by ARRS specifically for combat rescue in any weather. The aircraft included a stabilized Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) system, new computerized Doppler navigation system, a projected map display, and a terrain following radar. (Tyner, 1996, p.15)

The first Pave Low III passed its initial operational testing in August, 1976, and the Air Staff funded eight of the helicopters to be operational by 1980 (Tyner, 1996, p. 15).

Already stinging from not being chosen for the initial hostage rescue attempt, CSAR got yet another demoralizing shock when preparations for Operation Honey Badger, the follow-up rescue plan, stripped them of their HH-53Hs almost literally overnight. Operation Eagle Claw failed on 25 April 1980,

and less than three weeks later, on 14 May, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force ordered all HH-53Hs to be immediately transferred from MAC's Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service to TAC's 1<sup>st</sup> Special Operations Wing (SOW) (Tyner, 1996, p. 15). The helicopters were to be "included as part of a vastly increased armada of Army helicopters and the entire 1<sup>st</sup> SOW" (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 18). Rescue forces were excluded from the mission preparation in favor of a new Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) under the command of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 18).

Operation Honey Badger was never executed. After the failure of the first rescue attempt the Iranian government divided the American hostages into several small groups and moved them constantly. Unsure of the hostage's location, and facing unfavorable launch windows because of the short nights during summer months, U.S. leaders were not willing to launch the second attempt until the fall (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 18). Eventually, diplomatic efforts led to the release of all the American hostages. However, CSAR would never again see their HH-53Hs. As Whitcomb (2003) tells it:

The Pave Lows and crews stayed in the 20<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron at Hurlburt. This abrupt series of moves stripped the ARRS of its best, most capable combat rescue asset. The ARRS still had a small fleet of HH-53s. Some did have the old Limited Night Rescue System, but most were unmodified and shrinking in number. (p. 18)

To put it mildly, "The transfer of the Pave Lows became a source of great frustration and bitterness for those in ARRS" (Tyner, 1996, p. 15). It would take nearly ten solid years of intense bureaucratic infighting through the Air Force budget process before CSAR forces would field another combat-capable recovery platform in the HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter.

### **c. CSAR and AFSOF Combine under MAC's 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force**

Despite having quickly shifted ownership of ARRS's HH-53H helicopters to the 1<sup>st</sup> SOW, Air Force leadership still faced continued pressure from the national command authorities to increase the capability of AFSOF nearly three years after the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt. "Several after

action reports from Operation Eagle Claw and internal Air Force inspections suggested that to increase emphasis on Air Force special operations forces, the Air Force should consolidate all of its helicopters under one organization" (Whitcomb, 2003, p.19). The process that formally combined CSAR and AFSOF under the same organization proceeded as follows:

A combined Air Staff team from the Inspector General's office and the Deputy Chief of Staff for plans and operations office conducted a thorough inspection and review of the Air Force's special operations capability. Their report reconfirmed earlier findings and recommended that all special operations forces and rescue forces should be consolidated into a single unit, preferably a numbered Air Force. After a full air staff review, the Chief of Staff concurred with the studies and ordered the consolidation of the ARRS and Air Force special operations under a newly activated numbered Air Force. After discussions between the commanders of TAC and MAC, the Chief of Staff directed that the new numbered Air Force would be assigned to MAC and would be the 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force. For unity of command, this organization would absorb both the ARRS and all Air Force special operations forces. (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 19)

The commander of ARRS suggested that this new organizational array would allow the development of integrated force packages that could then be placed at various locations around the world and respond to both rescue and special operations taskings (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 19). However, the TAC Commander, General Wilbur Creech, made his support of the transfer conditional on a guarantee that AFSOF be allowed to maintain "its separate identity". The MAC staff agreed, seeing the "identity issue" as a minor concession compared to the fact that they had won the battle for special operations missions and resources (Tyner, 1996, p. 19).

As it turned out, MAC's 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force would be composed of two separate organizational entities: the ARRS at Scott AFB, Illinois, which would still command all of the rescue forces, and a newly activated 2<sup>nd</sup> Air Division located at Hurlburt Field, Florida that would command all special operations forces units. Each entity would maintain its distinct identity in accordance with General Creech's wishes (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 19).

Even though they were to “maintain their distinct identity”, Air Force special operations forces were uncomfortable being moved from TAC to MAC due to perceived differences in organizational culture. As Chinnery (1998) tells it:

The news [of transfer from TAC to MAC] hit Hurlburt like a late summer hurricane, and the immediate response was largely negative. SOF troops viewed TAC as a command of warriors, and the move to MAC was viewed by most of SOF as a definite step down and an indication that Air Force leadership considered them as “trash haulers” and combat supporters, not leading edge, point-of-the-spear warriors. (p. 233)

Regardless of the reservations in the AFSOF community, the transfer took place on 1 March 1983. The transfer received a much warmer reception among personnel in MAC, mostly because of organizational imperatives. Whitcomb (2003) describes the MAC leadership’s reaction to the transfer in his passage:

MAC commanders were happy with the arrangement because it gave them a way to protect their weather reconnaissance forces and rescue units in a numbered Air Force equal in stature to its 21<sup>st</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> Air Forces that commanded the airlift units...The first commander of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force, Major General William Mall, was also pleased with the arrangement. Even though the two “communities” would maintain a separation, he felt that a synergy naturally existed between them. This synergy had been exhibited many times, especially during combat operations in Southeast Asia...In an interview with MAC’s *Airlifter Magazine*, he stated: “We created 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force primarily to enhance the SOF mission. The move capitalized on the synergism that exists between the special operations forces and the combat rescue forces because their mission, training, and equipment is similar...Combat rescue has always augmented the special operations forces mission, but now we are training these forces in special operations tactics to a greater extent than ever before. Additionally, some special operations forces equipment is compatible and can serve both roles. The special operations forces Pave Low helicopters, for instance, have the capability to rescue a downed pilot in combat

and still perform a special operations function without extensive modification of equipment or crew changes”. (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 19-20)

Overall, General Mall saw the benefits of consolidating training, tactics, maintenance, and supply from one headquarters as the key to providing the military “with the capability to move our forces from one mission area to another to best accomplish both [AFSOF and CSAR] tasks” (Tyner, 1996, p. 21).

***d. “Forward Look” Further Decimates CSAR***

Due to events far beyond his control, “the new 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force did not become the synergistic model expected by General Mall” (Tyner, 1996, p. 21). Operations in Grenada and Lebanon exposed recurring problems in the nation’s overall SOF capabilities that were supposed to have been addressed after the failure of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt. Powerful members in Congress decided that the services might need to be fundamentally reorganized. Congressman Dan Daniel (D-VA), Chairman of the powerful House Armed Services Committee (HASC) proposed an idea to create a new special operations force or command as a new “sixth service” (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 21). In an article he wrote in the August 1985 Armed Forces Journal, Congressman Daniel stated:

For the last four years, the current administration has been pursuing the revitalization of our SOF capability. The Secretary of Defense has assigned the highest priority to this effort. Congressional support has been strong (and is growing); media attention has been intense (and generally favorable); and the public interest is intensifying. (Tyner, 1996, p. 27-28)

The new commander of the 23rd Air Force, Major General Robert Patterson, responded to the intense Congressional pressure to quickly improve SOF capability by directing his staff to do a study called “Forward Look” (Tyner, 1996, p. 28). The study recommended that Air Force special operations forces be rapidly expanded from one wing equivalent to three at the direct expense of CSAR forces (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 22). The plan directed the transfer of all of ARRS’s HC-130 tankers and remaining HH-53s to the AF special operations forces for the creation of overseas wings (Tyner, 1996, p. 28). The plan was approved by the new MAC commander, General Duane Cassidy, on 30

December 1985, and by the Air Force Council on 28 May 1986 (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 22).

In the wake of “Forward Look” ARRS was left with literally no realistic combat rescue capability. A classified study titled “23<sup>rd</sup> AF assessment of Air Force Combat Rescue Capability” described all the assets remaining in ARRS units as “non-combat capable” (Tyner, 1996, p. 28). Devoid of assets capable of performing combat recovery, ARRS was reduced to a largely administrative agency engaged in peacetime support roles and missions.

#### **4. Rise of SOCOM Forces CSAR/AFSOF Split**

Continued frustration at the military’s lack of action to improve the nation’s overall SOF capability drove Congress and President Reagan to take the matter into their own hands. The Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the 1987 Defense Authorization Bill included language creating United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM, 2003, p. 9). As a unified combatant command, SOCOM would have components from each of the services. The USAF’s contribution was 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force. After “Forward Look”, AFSOF in 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force’s 2<sup>nd</sup> Air Division had three Special Operations Wings: the 1<sup>st</sup> at Hurlburt Field, Florida, the 39<sup>th</sup> in Europe, and the 353<sup>rd</sup> in the Pacific (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 24). “To align his command to the new reality, General Patterson moved 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force Headquarters from Scott AFB, Illinois to Hurlburt Field, Florida and deactivated the 2<sup>nd</sup> Air Division” (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 24). As its special operations units immediately began to work and train with the other elements of SOCOM, CSAR forces in 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force’s ARRS became even more marginalized. Whitcomb (2003) captures the deeply dejected sentiment among CSAR units in his passage:

The effect of all of this on the rescue community was disheartening. Except for one unit in the Pacific, they had been stripped of their most capable combat rescue helicopters and tankers and had shrunk to one wing-equivalent in total force structure. The assets taken away were being used to build up the three special operations wings. What aircraft remained were considered non-combat capable. More importantly, their owning command had completely changed its character. They were orphans in a

command with a much different focus. And most importantly, their future as represented by the procurement program for new helicopters had been cancelled. (p. 24)

**a. AFSOF Sent to Newly Formed AFSOC**

Even after the establishment of SOCOM, 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force was still administratively part of MAC and still owned distinctly non-SOF elements. These included weather reconnaissance and aeromedical airlift units in addition to the CSAR forces in ARRS. General James Lindsey, the first commander of SOCOM, was unhappy with the arrangement. “He wanted nothing to do with these units and asked the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Larry Welch, to transfer them back to MAC and to re-designate the 23<sup>rd</sup> AF as a major command as it transferred over to SOCOM” (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 24). General Welch agreed. The non-SOF units were transferred back to MAC in 1989, and the 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force became Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) in May of 1990 (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 24). Major General Hugh Cox, an AFSOF MC-130 pilot and the first director of operations for SOCOM, recalls the profound organizational turbulence of the era in his statement, “The 1980s were marked by controversy, inter-service and intra-Air Force rivalries, jealousies, and frequent disruptive reorganization before the emergence of AFSOC with its own major command status” (Chinnery, 1994, p. 233).

**b. CSAR Retained and Reborn in MAC**

The creation of AFSOC, and the resultant transfer of control over nearly all the USAF’s CSAR-capable assets to SOCOM, “convinced Air Force leaders that they needed to revitalize the service’s combat recovery capability” (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 26). The Air Staff published a two-year study, the Rescue Force Structure Plan, that laid out a comprehensive program to rebuild an Air Force combat rescue capability. “Its stated goal was the recovery of 65 percent of all aircrews downed in combat” (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 26).

The MAC Commander, General Cassidy, took advantage of this study and made a bold effort to reclaim CSAR’s honored legacy within the Air Force which was earned in the crucible of Vietnam combat operations. He

developed a two-pronged strategy for revitalizing Air Force CSAR aimed at reversing its post-Vietnam drift towards peacetime roles.

The first prong was organizational. General Cassidy convinced senior Air Force Leadership to “remove ARRS from the disbanding 23<sup>rd</sup> Air Force, rename it the Air Rescue Service (ARS), and relocate it to McClellan AFB, California” (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 27). Whitcomb (2003) describes the dramatic organizational transformation as follows:

The ARS was activated at McClellan on August 8, 1989 and assigned directly to MAC. With that activation, the rescue forces and special operations forces were separate. Since the war in Southeast Asia, the rescue community had come full circle. Unfortunately, in making the journey, it had lost its best combat rescue aircraft. It would take time to correct the shortfall...Upon activation, the ARS published its mission statement. It stated: “Air Rescue Service (ARS) is the focal point for USAF rescue...The primary mission of ARS is combat rescue which traditionally involves the helicopter recovery of downed aircrew members from a hostile environment, usually supported by HC-130 tankers and dedicated fighter aircraft.” (p. 27)

The second prong of General Cassidy’s CSAR revitalization strategy was acquisitional. Since all of ARRS’s HH-53s had been transferred to AFSOF for Pave Low modification, the staple aircraft of ARS units was the old, obsolescent HH-3. This motivated General Cassidy to revitalize old initiatives to procure new helicopters. His efforts began to pay off when the Air Staff programmed money to buy 16 UH-60As, which were modified for rescue duty and fielded as much more technologically advanced HH-60Gs. These aircraft were scheduled to be delivered by 1989 as the first part of a steady buy of 10 aircraft a year for several years. They would be used to equip active, Guard, and AF Reserve units. In February 1990, ARS began to receive its first HH-60Gs. They were assigned to the units in Korea and the Air National Guard (Whitcomb, 2003, p. 27). Unfortunately, and as described previously, deliveries of new HH-60Gs trickled in a little too late to be of use in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

## **5. McPeak's Dream Sends CSAR from AMC to ACC**

In the early 1990s Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill "Tony" McPeak engineered immense organizational restructuring throughout the entire Air Force. MAC absorbed tanker assets from disbanded Cold War stalwart Strategic Air Command (SAC), and was renamed Air Mobility Command (AMC) on 1 June 1992 (Brunkow and Wilcoxson, 2001, p. 1). This initial reorganization had little impact on the structure General Cassidy had put in place for ARS.

However, under General McPeak's "one base, one boss" objective wing concept, many units were shifted between MAJCOMS in order to place them under the control of the command that hosted them (Brunkow and Wilcoxson, 2001, p. 7). This dynamic, combined with General McPeak's other pet project, "Total Quality Management" (TQM), precipitated yet another major reorganization of CSAR. In the TQM era of "focused customer service", AMC undertook several actions "to remove functions that were peripheral to the strategic air mobility mission" (Brunkow and Wilcoxson, 2001, p. 7). One of these actions was the divestiture of the newly revived Air Rescue Service.

Air Combat Command, a new MAJCOM formed from a combination of TAC assets and bomber forces from defunct SAC, became the executive agent for air rescue on 1 July 1993 (Brunkow and Wilcoxson, 2001, p. 7). ARS units were split between ACC, USAFE, and PACAF in order to better align with the Unified Command Plan that spawned from the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. In TQM terms, the idea was to make CSAR forces more "customer oriented" by placing them "under the direct control of the command whose downed pilots were the primary beneficiaries of the rescue service" (Brunkow and Wilcoxson, 2001, p. 7).

## **6. CSAR Shortfalls Force Merger with AFSOF**

ACC leadership never captured or sustained the momentum generated for CSAR by General Cassidy in MAC. After 10 years in ACC, "CSAR remained an overstressed, over-tasked mission area that was never able to get to the top of ACC's list of priorities" (Herbert, 2003, p. 5). In 2003 the ACC commander, General Hal Hornburg, admitted his organization's "less than adequate job" of

budgeting for CSAR, “even though ACC units are the most in need of rescue support” (Herbert, 2003, p. 5).

In the wake of CSAR’s inability to provide timely support for the opening salvos of OEF, General John Jumper, the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF), was quick to order a review of the CSAR mission area. In October 2001, while bombs were still falling in Afghanistan, he ordered a comprehensive study of alternatives that resulted in a number of proposals (AFSOC/DOXJ, 2004, p. 3). One of these was to transfer CSAR units to AFSOC. General Jumper was USAFE Commander during Allied Force in Kosovo, so he had already “acutely felt the lack of a permanent CSAR presence in Europe” and had witnessed the successful rescues of downed F-117 and F-16 pilots by AFSOC forces (Herbert, 2003, p. 3). On 21 February 2003, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Air Force, General Jumper signed CSAF Program Action Directive (PAD) 02-09 that formally directed the transfer of all CONUS-based CSAR assets from ACC to AFSOC (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. 1). The PAD set an implementation date of 1 October 2003. Due to legal issues in the Unified Command Plan and turf battles with Regional Combatant Commanders, CSAR units based overseas in EUCOM and PACOM remained under the control of their respective theater air component (see Figure 1) (AFSOC/DOXJ, 2004, p. 4).

Overall, the transfer affected units containing nearly 9000 personnel and 120 aircraft (AFSOC/DOXJ, 2004, p. 4). In general, “Air Force Leaders believe the move will strengthen CSAR operations, make them more efficient, and raise their profile by putting them in a smaller organization” (Herbert, 2003, p.1). The hope is that these benefits will materialize because “the rescue mission will not be an afterthought in AFSOC as it was in ACC” (Herbert, 2003, p. 3). The remainder of my study is dedicated to evaluating the long-term prospects for these benefits to actually accrue.

## C. CONCLUSION

This chapter’s historical overview provides context to my follow-on, more detailed analysis of CSAR’s recent organizational transfer to AFSOC. Three main points from this chapter bear remembering as you move through the rest of

my study. First, CSAR capability is a vital strategic national resource in its own right. Second, CSAR has never lacked exceptional people, but various organizational constraints have prevented dedicated CSAR forces from effectively contributing timely capability in three out of our nation's last four major conflicts, leaving SOF to fill the gap. Third, CSAR has had a turbulent organizational history punctuated by four major, disruptive reorganization schemes in the last twenty years that involved varying degrees of connection with AFSOF. With these three points in mind, the rest of my study will show how AFSOC's current organizational construct contains durable cultural and structural characteristics that are likely to result in historically more effective development and application of dedicated CSAR capability.

## **IV. CULTURE SHOCK**

### **A. OH WHAT A DIFFERENCE A YEAR MAKES**

In April 2003, after two years as the Chief MC-130P Combat Shadow evaluator pilot for Air Force Special Operations Command Standardization and Evaluation (AFSOC/DOV), I departed headquarters for a master's degree program at the Naval Postgraduate School. The CSAR transfer was just heating up as an issue in DOV and elsewhere in headquarters. Directorates were entering a four-month sprint to complete the administrative details necessary to meet the mandated CSAR consolidation date of 1 October 2003. I returned to AFSOC Headquarters in July 2004 to do research for this project and was struck by a dramatic change in organizational culture. It appeared to me that there had been a sea-change in traditional assumptions and attitudes regarding the roles and missions of the command's airframes. The clannishness and parochialism that I had seen heavily influence the decision-making structure during my tenure seemed to have greatly faded, leaving the command more focused on developing broad capabilities than on "gold-plating" individual platforms.

I will illustrate and evaluate this change in organizational culture, as well as assess its potential effects on CSAR, in four steps. First, I'll define organizational culture and discuss how the concept applies to Air Force aviation culture in general and AFSOC's aviation culture in particular. Second, I'll present anecdotes from personal experience in dealing with MC-130P issues at AFSOC Headquarters that help illustrate this profound shift in culture. Third, I'll hypothesize a possible explanation for AFSOC's culture shift based on organizational theory. Finally, I'll relate the effects this culture shift is likely to have on CSAR in AFSOC. Overall, in this chapter I hope to vividly illustrate what seems to be a major shift in organizational culture within AFSOC Headquarters, provide a plausible explanation for the shift based on organizational theory, and describe how this shift bodes well for the long-term effectiveness of CSAR in AFSOC.

## B. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

An organization's "culture" is the "set of values, guiding beliefs, understandings, and ways of thinking that are shared by [existing] members...and taught to new members as correct. It represents the unwritten, feeling part of the organization" (Daft, 2003, p. 112). On the surface, organizational culture is evident in "the ways people dress and act, and the symbols, stories, and ceremonies that organization members share" (p. 112). On a deeper level, culture is the "underlying values, assumptions, beliefs, and thought processes" common to members in the organization (p. 112). At its inception on 22 May 1990, AFSOC inherited very special military flying units diversely rich in their own individual and distinctive "surface" cultures (AFSOC, 2002, p. 1). Air Force Air Commando units all had unique symbols, stories, and ceremonies that defined their "specialness" within their respective mission areas. These units conformed nicely to the USSOCOM adage that "no one joins SOF per se. Instead they join a unit, unique in its history, culture, and contribution to the joint SOF team. Our nation is better served as a result of this diversity" (USSOCOM, 2003, p. 12).

### 1. "Deep" Cultural Assumptions and Parochialism

Within the diversity of "surface" cultures among AFSOC's individual flying units runs a "deep" culture common to aircrews throughout all of Air Force aviation: fierce pride in one's own weapon system and good-natured competitiveness with other units. Carl Builder (1989) captures the essence of this special, aviation-inspired pride in his passage:

Air Force [aircrews] often identify themselves with an airplane: 'I'm a 141 driver.' 'I flew BUFFS.' Sometimes this identification goes right down to a particular model of an airplane: 'I fly F-4Cs'. The pride of association is with a machine, sometimes even before the institution...There has always been a healthy rivalry among [aircrews] of different types of aircraft, not only among categories of aircraft flown, but even down to models of the same category [sound familiar MC-130E/H/P crews?...]...This affinity of [aircrew] for airplane has its parallel in history in the cavalry soldier and his horse. The airman, like the cavalryman, was not known for his modesty, or his objectivity, when it came to the employment of his chosen steed. (p. 22-23, 26, 33)

Thus, it can be said that aircrews tend to form very parochial, “tribal” groups intensely loyal to their assigned airframes. Webster defines parochialism as “a narrowness of opinions” (Bolander, 1992, p. 290). A certain amount of “narrowness” in SOF/CSAR aviation at the proper level is quite healthy. As mentioned above, fierce pride in your own weapon system and good-natured competition with other units is very common throughout the Air Force. In my experience, this “narrowness” fosters esprit de corps and excellence within AFSOC flying units. However, I also experienced how these “healthy” parochial attitudes become corrosive and harm overall combat capability when they leave the flightline and end up unduly influencing long-term budget and acquisition decisions at headquarters. An issue from my personal experience helps demonstrate the culture shift within AFSOC Headquarters from an unhealthy level of parochialism to a broader capabilities approach. The issue was the saga to get all-weather capability (specifically terrain-following (TF) radar) funded for the MC-130P.

## C. UNHEALTHY PAROCHIALISM IN ACTION

### 1. MC-130P TF Case Study

A brief background review of the overall TF issue will aid in making my point. AFSOC’s family of three MC-130 variants specialize in covert aerial refueling of special operations helicopters and the clandestine insertion, extraction, and resupply of special forces troops by airdrop or landing on austere runways (USSOCOM, 2003, p. 74).

MC-130s are slow and have no offensive armament; therefore flying low to the ground at night and remaining undetected by an enemy is critical to accomplishing these tasks. Two of the MC-130 variants, the MC-130E Combat Talon 1 and MC-130H Combat Talon 2 (henceforth collectively referred to as “Talons”), have advanced terrain-following (TF) radars that allow them to fly 250 feet above the ground at night regardless of lunar illumination or weather conditions. The pilots have no need to look outside as they follow computer generated symbols on their displays. The third variant, the MC-130P Combat Shadow (henceforth referred to as “Shadow”), has no TF system. Its pilots rely

on visual pilotage through night vision goggles (NVGs) combined with verbal directions from two navigators to operate in the night low-level environment. The Shadow is therefore not equipped to safely fly low in bad weather where the pilots' visibility is restricted.

This TF disparity between Talons and Shadows has persisted despite the Shadow's long-standing, validated operational requirement for all-weather capability (USSOCOM, nd, p. 5). Much as racing teams do not have requirements for a certain percentage of slow race cars, AFSOC has no official requirement for "fair-weather" MC-130s. The fact that Shadows are currently not all-weather capable is simply a result of consistently deferred budget priority since the aircraft were first assigned to AFSOC in 1990. The inability of Shadows to get funding priorities was at least partly due to traditional clannish parochialism, or "hyper-advocacy", by Talon advocates in headquarters positions pushing decisions to keep TF capability unique to their own community.

The Talon community's general resistance to TF radar upgrade on the Shadow has deep historical roots. All-weather low-level penetration of hostile airspace is the singularly unique capability of the Talon fleet that has defined its special niche in SOF fixed-wing aviation since the first TF radars were installed in the Talon 1 during the Vietnam War. As I saw it, TF had been their signature capability for so long that an unhealthy "deep" cultural assumption had formed within the Talon community that TF was their exclusive domain. The resistance I sensed in headquarters seemed to revolve around the idea that spreading TF capability to other fixed-wing airframes, regardless of validated requirements, threatened the Talons' "specialness" and their position as the platforms of choice for high priority missions.

The discussions I pressed on the TF issue rarely centered on rational cost-benefit analysis; rather the debate was always shaded by this Talon cultural issue. In terms of organizational theory, ingrained "deep" cultural beliefs about the role of the Talon within AFSOC led Talon advocates at headquarters to erect "barriers to change". Of the five barriers to change defined by Daft (2003), "fear

of loss" of prestige and status was the most prolific barrier I personally experienced when dealing with Talon advocates about TF upgrade for the Shadow (p. 146).

A particular instance from a summer 2002 staff meeting is very representative of the barriers to change and entrenched parochialism I consistently came up against on the TF issue throughout my two years at AFSOC Headquarters. I had recently returned from a combat deployment in Afghanistan during which my crew and I had providentially survived a crash in an MC-130P that I felt any kind of automated TF cuing device probably would have prevented. In the meeting, which was about the integration of the SOCOM-funded Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration (CAAP) program with the Air Force-funded Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), I pointed out the MC-130P's validated requirement for TF (a copy of USSOCOM Joint Operational Requirements Document 022-91-IC was on the table), and I related the sequence of events that led up to my crash into a mountain in the Hindu Kush range.

At the conclusion of the meeting, and after vociferously pointing out numerous reasons why he thought SOCOM could probably never be convinced to fund CAAP/TF for the MC-130P, a full Colonel assigned to the AMP/CAAP Integration Team blurted out, "In theory I guess TF *might* be okay for the Shadow, as long as you're not trying to be a *Talon*." I'm not sure what enraged me more: the absurdity of the statement itself, or the fact that neither I nor anybody else in the room was particularly surprised such a statement was made. After hearing in detail about how our plane crashed, how my seven crewmates and I were nearly killed, and how all of this could probably have been avoided by installation of the TF system, this relatively senior decision-maker in AFSOC's fleet modernization plans "circled the wagons" for the Talon community. The narrow, parochial focus displayed by this Colonel (a Talon 1 pilot by trade) to the utter exclusion of any "big picture" concern for the safety of AFSOC aircrew members was startling. He made his lukewarm advocacy for installing TF on the Shadow contingent on somehow maintaining the Talon fleet's special cultural

niche in SOF fixed-wing aviation. Such is the power of “deep” cultural assumptions, and such was the type of parochialism that had entrenched itself in the decision-making structure of AFSOC. I had experienced first-hand Daft’s (2003) contention that, “It is only when organizations try to implement new strategies or programs that go against basic culture norms and values that they come face-to-face with the power of culture” (p. 112).

#### **D. CRACKS IN TRADITIONAL PAROCHIAL ARMOR**

When I returned to AFSOC Headquarters in July 2004 to conduct research for this project, I expected to encounter the same cultural “barriers to change” regarding CSAR integration that I had faced a year earlier in my battles over TF upgrade for the Shadow, only writ large. In my mind, the scale of the uphill battles I faced at headquarters in helping get upgrades for MC-130Ps paled to the magnitude of the wholesale organizational change imposed by CSAR consolidation. I expected to find that the entrenched, parochial “powers that be” within headquarters had moved swiftly to establish CSAR at the bottom of the cultural “pecking order”.

After my first two days of research at headquarters, I was stunned by the relative absence of parochial attitudes in the very same offices I had butted heads with in the past. A new “big picture” atmosphere seemed to displace the narrowly focused, platform-based dialogue that pervaded headquarters culture during my tenure. Two concrete examples representing gaping cracks in traditional parochialist armor illustrate the extent of cultural change I experienced. First, funding for CAAP/TF on the Shadow, which was a non-starter when I departed headquarters, had recently been approved. For me, this was like finding the Holy Grail. A transformational improvement I had directly fought for throughout my two years at AFSOC Headquarters, and had been advocating since I began flying Shadows over 13 years ago, had suddenly come to fruition. Second, a broad coalition of Shadow and Talon crewmembers from the DO and XP directorates had been assigned to serve with new CSAR HC-130 crewmembers (and dedicated CSAR contractors) on an internal HC-130 Integrated Process Team (IPT). It struck me as completely new and different

that other “tribes” would be so intimately involved in an IPT whose sole purpose is to forward recommendations for CSAR HC-130 improvements to an Air Force-level IPT for Personnel Recovery.

These specific examples fed a sense of general culture change I found so profound that it altered the direction of my research. Seeking confirmation, I questioned Shadow and CSAR crewmembers on the AFSOC staff in the DO and XP directorates specifically about this change in headquarters ambience. Shadow colleagues uniformly agreed that a change in atmosphere had occurred. Long-standing MC-130P issues that had been routinely marginalized in the bureaucratic shuffle now at least reached the table for serious discussion and consideration. CSAR crewmembers I talked to uniformly expressed that they felt welcomed into the headquarters organization, and they experienced no overt attempts to ensure that they were denigrated to the bottom of the cultural “pecking order”.

So what was it that changed so drastically between April 2003 and July 2004 that could have such a profound impact on the “deep” culture in AFSOC Headquarters? What caused the “underlying values, assumptions, beliefs, and thought processes” within headquarters to shift away from clannish, tribal parochialism centered on individual platforms, and towards a broader, more healthy focus on capabilities (Daft, 1993, p. 112)? Why had an issue that had been festering for well over a decade (TF on the Shadow) suddenly gained traction, broad advocacy, and funding? How had a massive organizational realignment (CSAR integration) occurred with such little apparent parochial friction in a headquarters previously characterized by tribal, platform-based loyalty?

#### **E. ENVIRONMENTAL SHIFT LEADS TO CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE**

The culture shift I perceived that suddenly had traditional parochialists advocating TF for the Shadow and had broken tribal lines to contribute to a CSAR-specific IPT can be best explained using organizational theory. I hypothesize that AFSOC’s apparent shift in organizational culture has been in

response to a major shift in the command's assumed operating environment, and that the culture shift has been further enabled by top-down leadership initiatives. A discussion of the academic concept of organizational environment and how it applies to AFSOC's cultural shift will lead into a discussion of the effects leadership initiatives have had in engineering and sustaining organizational change.

### **1. Organizational Environment as a Concept**

An organization's environment is defined as "all elements that exist outside the boundary of the organization that have the potential to affect all or part of the organization" (Daft, 2003, p. 50). An organization's "task environment" is a sub-unit of the overall general environment and "includes sectors that have a direct impact on the organization's ability to achieve its goals" (p. 51). Daft (2003) defines ten of these environmental "sectors" in which organizations stake out their "domain". Sectors are "subdivisions of the external environment that contain similar elements", and domain is "the chosen environmental field of action" (p. 50).

Daft's ten sectors were derived for corporate organizations operating in commercial markets. AFSOC is a military organization operating in a political "market", so rather than applying Daft's model in its entirety, I have "cherry picked" those sectors from Daft's model that directly impact AFSOC's ability to accomplish its mission. AFSOC's primary responsibilities and budgets are provided by higher level authorities in the United States Government and at USSOCOM, so I have combined Daft's Government and Financial Resources sectors for the purpose of defining AFSOC's domain. The resulting key environmental sectors that comprise AFSOC's domain within its task environment are the Government/Financial Resources sector, Technology sector, Human Resources sector, and the International sector (See Figure 3).




Figure 3. AFSOC Domain for Mission Accomplishment

## 2. Organizational Environment in Action

In its most basic organizational sense, AFSOC takes financial resources and planning guidance from higher headquarters (HHQ), combines them with advanced equipment and human resources provided respectively by industry and the U.S. Air Force, and produces highly trained Air Commandos proficient in the use of their advanced equipment. All of this is done in order to provide the United States military specialized warfighting capabilities to address a defined range of perceived external threats. Changes in the assumed nature of the external threats in the international sector (highlighted in red in Figure 3) are the focal point for the change in organizational culture that I witnessed at AFSOC Headquarters.

Prior to the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, in response to standing concept plans (CONPLANS), AFSOC had shaped itself to support Desert One-type scenarios: deliberately planned, highly precise, short duration strikes against singular strategic targets. In my 12 years of operational flying in AFSOC, every major joint exercise or HHQ inspection I participated in revolved around just such a “single hit” scenario.

In this task environment, an “A” team / “B” team mentality (varsity versus junior varsity) was allowed to flourish. The major organizational assumption about threats in the external environment was that any individual “big mission” could be accomplished with a small number of extremely capable assets drawn from the “A” team. In a limited resource environment, much funding went to develop exceptionally advanced capabilities in the “A” team segment of the command’s airframes rather than developing baseline capabilities across the command’s entire fleet. The “shiniest toys”, assumed to be at the vanguard of any particular strategic mission, seemed to always get the most attention for capabilities upgrade.

During my tours in the 58<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Wing at Kirtland AFB and in AFSOC Headquarters at Hurlburt Field, I watched with envy as money seemed to fall out of the sky every time the Talon 2 had a minor issue. Funding instantly materialized for quieter cargo fans, bigger air conditioners, advanced software upgrades, and even autonomous landing system flight test programs. This “gold-plating” of an already very capable platform went on as the much older Shadow languished without even a baseline all-weather capability.

Since the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, combat operations around the world in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have turned previous assumptions about AFSOC’s task environment upside down. Surgical employment on individual strategic targets has given way to constant, simultaneous, widespread deployment and employment across the globe in multiple theaters of operation. In this new task environment, baseline capabilities throughout AFSOC’s fleet

gain higher prominence as there are simply not enough of the gold-plated, shiny toys to cover all AFSOC's worldwide commitments simultaneously.

It was exactly this realization about the new nature of AFSOC's task environment that led to \$25 million in CAAP/TF funding for the MC-130P. Joe Norris, a previous Talon 1 pilot and now a central figure in AFSOC's AMP/CAAP development team as a contractor in the Avionics Modernization and Training Systems office in the XP directorate, shared the specific argument that his shop used to "sell" the idea of funding CAAP on the MC-130P to USSOCOM. The following excerpts from the formal issue initiative briefing given at USSOCOM show the issue was couched in terms of matching the aircraft's capabilities to its actual wartime operating environment and providing expanded baseline capability to support AFSOC's ongoing operations in the GWOT. In its "impact if not funded" section, the briefing states:

Combat Shadows will continue high risk low level flight without a TF/TA system placing aircrews and mission accomplishment in jeopardy. [This] directly impacts SOF's ability to support future GWOT operations -- aircraft will not have required avionics to support Detection Avoidance Navigation Threat Avoidance Navigation (DANTAN) concept of operation... critical Mission Area Plan detection and penetration deficiencies [will persist] and [result in continued failure to] meet CAAP Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) requirements.

Thus, in the MC-130P CAAP/TF example, a strong organizational desire to remain relevant in the GWOT trumped traditional parochial notions about the sanctity of TF to the Talon fleet. In a more general sense, AFSOC was forced to challenge some of its "deep" cultural assumptions as the organization recognized drastic changes in its task environment fueled by the GWOT.

## **F. LEADERSHIP INITIATIVES HELP FIGHT PAROCHIALISM**

### **1. Senior Leader Initiatives**

Superimposed on AFSOC's internal recognition of its new task environment are top-down Air Force leadership initiatives to refocus the entire Air Force away from its tradition of developing individual gold-plated platforms to a new focus on developing and providing broad capabilities to the joint warfighting

team. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) recently acknowledged this Air Force-wide problem of platform-based parochialism when he wrote:

We must continue to break down the functional stovepipes and tribal loyalties that stand in the way of translating our vision into decisive operational capability. We must get out of the mode of thinking only in terms of platform rather than in terms of capabilities. (Jumper, 2003, p. 1)

Lieutenant General Paul V. Hester brought a similar outlook to AFSOC when he assumed leadership of the command early in 2002. An F-15 pilot with no dog in AFSOC's traditional parochial fights, Lt. General Hester echoed the Air Force Chief of Staff's sentiments about focusing on capabilities rather than platforms when he recently wrote, "To stay a step ahead in a changing world, AFSOC must prepare for an uncertain future by developing effects-based warfighting capabilities that provide flexibility to operate throughout the full range of military operations" (Hester, 2003, p. i).

My discussions with other senior leaders at AFSOC Headquarters, in both operational and administrative capacities, mirrored just such a new emphasis on providing a consistent set of broad capabilities to Joint Force Commanders engaged in the GWOT (versus previous focus on traditional Desert One-type "single hit" scenarios). In separate interviews on 27 July 2004, AFSOC's Deputy Director for Operations (ADO) and its Deputy Director of Plans and Programs (AXP) both told me how they specifically guard against the type of debilitating parochialism they experienced while rising through the ranks in order to affect this new emphasis on general capabilities.

## **2. Operational Initiatives**

On the operational side, Colonel Tommy Hull, AFSOC/ADO (and an MH-53 Pave Low pilot by trade), told me how careful he was while serving as the Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander in the Afghani campaign to objectively assign missions to the unit/airframe best suited to the mission rather than allowing the cultural "pecking order" to enter into the calculation. In one

instance, I personally witnessed Colonel Hull's dedication to this principle when he assigned Shadows to help conduct a traditional "bread and butter" Talon mission in Afghanistan.

The particular tasking Colonel Hull received was to infiltrate a coalition SOF team with eight armored humvees into an airfield in a remote area of Afghanistan. Much like TF, blacked-out airland infiltration is historically the cultural niche of the Talon community. Objective calculations about which available airframes could most quickly and effectively get the required number of vehicles to the landing site led Colonel Hull to assign two Talon 2s and two Shadows to the mission, even though Talon 1s were also available. This was because the Talon 1s could carry only one vehicle each due to their cargo compartment configuration, and the Talon 2s and Shadows could each carry two vehicles.

On the surface, the decision to employ Shadows on this mission seems like a simple, non-controversial "no brainer". However, in the not too distant past (as in some airdrop taskings at the beginning of operations in Afghanistan), Shadows would not have even been considered for this type of mission. Rather, a tactically messy and convoluted scheme of maneuver would have been concocted to ensure Talons would have exclusive right to the mission, regardless of the operational limitations imposed by the Talon 1's restricted cargo compartment. Therefore, this type of simple reliance on weighing objective operational capabilities against mission requirements, in as much as it goes against previous subjective "deep" cultural assumptions about traditional roles of Talons and Shadows, illustrates leadership's commitment to discard the unhealthy parochial baggage AFSOC sometimes carried in employing its forces.

### **3. Administrative Initiatives**

On the administrative side, Colonel Leonard Smales, AFSOC/AXP (and a Shadow pilot by trade), told me he saw his job as getting the broadest, most balanced capability 'bang' for each 'buck' AFSOC spends, regardless of what platform the capability eventually resides in. Contained in this view is an implicit recognition of the shift in AFSOC's task environment that makes this focus on

providing broad, baseline capabilities necessary. CAAP/TF funding for the Shadow was one of a list of specific examples Colonel Smales mentioned of the types of projects the XP directorate is searching for that leverage huge capability increases out of relatively little money (\$1 million per aircraft to add transformational all-weather TF capability). Other high-impact, low-cost projects Colonel Smales mentioned included a laundry list of basic night vision compatibility and capability enhancements for CSAR airframes.

In reference to the traditional clannish parochialism he himself endured while rising through the ranks, Colonel Smales said, “There is no ‘us’ and ‘them’ anymore in this headquarters, there is only ‘us’”. The prevailing calculus in the XP directorate that drives budget and acquisition decisions involves the same kind of objective capabilities assessment mentioned above in the operational section. Colonel Smales said, “In an unlimited resource environment we would simply spend our way into equally advanced capabilities on all of our platforms”. However, resource limitations force the directorate to carefully match the most cost-effective capability to any given requirement. The “old way” of parochial tribes campaigning in isolation for upgrades to their respective platforms is dead and gone. The “gold plating” dynamic has given way to wider, deeper, more creative analysis of ends and means.

## **G. CONCLUSION AND IMPACT ON CSAR**

Given that AFSOC Headquarters is staffed largely with aircrew members from line flying units, and line flying units are natural breeding grounds for platform-based parochialism, it is completely natural for some parochialism to migrate into headquarters decision-making processes. As I explained earlier, this type of parochialism on HHQ staffs is by no means unique to AFSOC. Simply being assigned to a headquarters staff position certainly does not automatically endow an individual with a wider headquarters perspective. When parochial interests become the primary motivator behind long-term budget priorities and acquisition decisions, they become unhealthy and corrosive to the development of balanced, capabilities-based combat power. I personally experienced this type of corrosive parochialism at work during my two-year

tenure at AFSOC Headquarters. During a research visit to AFSOC Headquarters fifteen months after my departure from its staff, I saw that the organization had taken an abrupt turn away from this type of corrosive parochialism. I contend that this change in organizational culture can be best explained in terms of basic organizational theory, and that the change itself bodes well for the long-term effectiveness of CSAR under AFSOC.

In organizational theory, it is axiomatic that an organization's structure and culture are profoundly affected by the nature of its environment. In an academic sense, AFSOC's task environment is defined by its interaction with five of the 10 environmental sectors defined by Daft (Figure 3). Furthermore, as Dr. Erik Jansen, an expert in the field of organizational theory, pointed out in an August 2003 lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, "an organization's effectiveness is sometimes largely determined by its leadership's ability to obtain sufficiently accurate information from its environment to inform its major decisions".

From the environmental perspective, dramatic changes in AFSOC's task environment since the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks have led the organization to challenge its previous assumptions about the nature of the threats it needs to defeat. This, in turn, has generated profound changes in AFSOC's organizational culture as the organization reorients itself away from short duration, "single hit" scenarios and toward the expansive challenges inherent in the GWOT. From an organizational leadership perspective, changes in HHQ leadership's emphasis regarding parochialism further enable this shift to a capabilities-based approach. The sum of these internal and leadership-driven changes results in a general organizational environment at AFSOC Headquarters that is highly conducive to the long-term success of CSAR for three main reasons.

First, AFSOC's new breed of leaders, having bought in to the capabilities-based paradigm espoused by the CSAF, actively work to prevent traditional parochialism from wielding the undue influence on decisions that it had in the past. The Air Force Chief of Staff, the AFSOC Commander, and at least some

senior decision-makers in operational and administrative capacities at AFSOC Headquarters have dedicated themselves to shifting away from platform-based parochialism. This helps create an overall command climate favorable to the integration of the new ideas, issues, and capabilities CSAR brings to AFSOC.

Second, the Shadow CAAP/TF example demonstrates that AFSOC Headquarters, despite being a large organization with deeply ingrained culture, is flexible enough to reorient itself in dramatic ways in response to changes in its task environment. Because of the relative ease with which this general dynamic of adaptation to the demands of the GWOT was able to resolve one of the most long-standing and intractable issues I ever dealt with at AFSOC, I doubt it was an isolated incident. Rather, its positive effects on overall decision-making can be extrapolated and carried forward into AFSOC's handling of similarly long-standing CSAR issues. If true, this certainly bodes well for the long-term effectiveness of CSAR in AFSOC. The Shadow CAAP/TF example proves AFSOC possesses the flexibility to effectively adapt itself to changes in its task environment, so it is not much of a stretch to expect similar flexibility and effectiveness in the organization's larger incorporation of CSAR responsibilities.

Third, the more capabilities-based culture at AFSOC Headquarters fosters an internal physical working environment very favorable to CSAR crewmembers' productivity. Having more or less shed its parochial straight jacket, AFSOC apparently integrated its new CSAR staff with little if any attempt to impose its traditional cultural "pecking order" mentality. During my research visit, the whole place just had a different "feel" to it. In contrast to the parochial "barriers to change" I faced during my tenure, this healthier work environment leads me to believe that AFSOC Headquarters is organizationally poised to energetically support its new CSAR staff by advocating CSAR issues at the highest level. Additional, more specific structural attributes I found in AFSOC Headquarters that favor CSAR's long-term success are detailed in the next chapter.

## V. ORGANIZING FOR ADVOCACY

### A. THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE WEIGHS IN ON CSAR

On 10 March 2004 the Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. James Roche, visited the Naval Postgraduate School, and I took the opportunity to ask him directly what the primary high-level motivations were for transferring CSAR forces to AFSOC. His immediate and unequivocal answer was that the transfer was intended to “increase the visibility and advocacy of CSAR issues within the Air Force”. He went on to explain how, since neither he nor other top Air Force leaders could ever hope to “get into the weeds” and become total experts on all critical CSAR issues, he wanted to create an advocacy structure that would help fix immediate critical problems as well as leave CSAR positioned to “fend for itself” long-term in order to break its historical “boom-bust” cycle. Since AFSOC already flew basically similar airframes in similar operational environments, Secretary Roche said it seemed like a natural fit to align CSAR forces under AFSOC. In terms of specific advocacy, Secretary Roche said it was his intent to make AFSOC’s three-star commander into CSAR’s principle advocate within the Air Force.

In the previous chapter, I described how a change in organizational culture within AFSOC Headquarters produced a general work environment that eased the organizational friction of CSAR integration and resulted in a general decision environment favorable to addressing CSAR issues. In this chapter, I show how AFSOC’s current unique array of organizational structures and processes addresses Secretary Roche’s intent of increasing CSAR visibility and advocacy by avoiding the typical structural tensions and dilemmas inherent in large organizational change. In general, I illustrate the enormous organizational benefits CSAR accrues from being integrated with SOF under AFSOC’s cultural umbrella, yet differentiated from SOF by structural imperatives. Specifically, I explain how legally mandated separate core processes produce low

levels of departmental interdependence, and ultimately embody a system of role clarity between CSAR and SOF forces in AFSOC that favors CSAR's long-term effectiveness.

## B. EXAMINATION OF CORE PROCESSES IN AFSOC

As put forth by Dornbusch and Scott (1975), "Structure has to be built around an organization's core process for transforming raw materials into finished products" (Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 51). From this simple fact, Dornbusch and Scott expand on the concept of "core process" as follows:

Every organization has a central process, or core technology, with at least three elements: raw materials, activities that transform raw materials into desired ends, and underlying beliefs about the cause-and-effect relations that link materials, activity, and outcome. (Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 51)

The bottom line is that in order for an organization to be effective, its "core processes or technologies must align with structure" (Bolman & Deal, p. 49). This section will focus on the core processes and procedures AFSOC uses to transform its allotted resources (money from the federal budget and "raw" airmen recruits from the USAF) into combat-ready CSAR and special operations forces (SOF) trained to accomplish their particular core mission tasks in support of Joint Force Commanders.

Much as organizations must first divide work into manageable pieces before reintegrating the pieces into a finished product, it is necessary to divide this discussion of AFSOC's complex transformation processes into manageable pieces in order to illustrate my overall point. First, I present AFSOC's overall production process in terms of Daft's "manufacturing" and "service" construct. Next, I describe the differentiated core processes through which AFSOC Headquarters assembles its CSAR and SOF "product lines". Then, I present a discussion of departmental interdependence in terms of Thompson's model to show how the interrelationships between CSAR and SOF production affect prospects for the long-term stability of CSAR. Finally, I reintegrate all of these ideas to show that a legally mandated overall structure of differentiated core

production processes produces near text-book role alignment that results in a good organizational “fit” for CSAR in AFSOC.

### **1. “Manufacturing” and “Service” Components of AFSOC**

Daft’s concepts of manufacturing and service technologies, much like his environmental sector model used in the previous chapter, are designed to evaluate corporate organizations in commercial markets. Therefore, the concepts are not wholly applicable to a complex military organization like AFSOC, which operates in a political “market”. However, employing Daft’s ideas to identify how AFSOC’s manufacturing-oriented departments relate to its service-oriented departments provides a very useful frame of reference for evaluating the follow-on issues of how differentiated core processes lead to limited departmental interdependence, and produce nearly pristine role alignment between AFSOC’s CSAR and SOF “product lines”.

The key differentiation between manufacturing and service organizations is the nature of the products they produce. In their purest sense, manufacturing organizations produce tangible products that can be inventoried and stored for later use. Service organizations produce intangible products that cannot be stored or inventoried; their services don’t really exist until demanded by the customer (Daft, 2003, P. 79). As Daft (2003) says, “It is difficult to find organizations that reflect 100 percent service or 100 percent manufacturing characteristics...The vast majority of organizations involve some combination of products and services” (p. 80).

Applying Daft’s concepts of manufacturing and service functions to AFSOC reveals that in its most basic sense, AFSOC Headquarters takes three “product lines” manufactured by three specialized subunits and integrates them into two separate sets of services that support Joint Force Commanders. AFSOC’s affiliated training subunits take individual airmen from the USAF and use financial resources provided by Air Force Headquarters and SOCOM Headquarters to transform them into “small-batch” production runs of specially trained airmen proficient in operating specialized equipment and performing specialized CSAR and SOF tactics (Daft, 2003, p. 73). AFSOC Headquarters

then integrates each of the three tangible “product lines” of specialized airmen through joint training, exercises, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) development in order to provide Joint Force Commanders the “services” inherent CSAR and SOF core tasks (Figure 4). The combat-ready forces are tangible products that AFSOC “inventories” for future use; hence they fit the manufacturing construct. The forces are employed to provide a range of “on demand” services at the request of a customer, hence the application of the service construct. Viewing AFSOC through this manufacturing and service construct simplifies the following discussion of its differentiated core processes, departmental interdependence, and role alignment.




Figure 4. AFSOC in Daft's Production Construct

## **2. AFSOC's Differentiated Core Processes**

According to Snook (2000), “To deal with increasingly complex tasks, systems create specialized subunits. Once these subunits are segmented or differentiated, the primary challenge becomes one of integration or coordination – putting them back together again” (p. 143). This dynamic is further supported by Daft (2003), who defines “lack of coordination and cooperation” as one of five primary “barriers to change” faced by organizations undergoing realignment (p. 145). The overall concern for the organization is that “fragmentation and conflict often result from a lack of coordination for change implementation” and that “old and new systems must be compatible” (Daft, 2003, p. 145).

Fortunately for CSAR, AFSOC appears to have been able to avoid many of the classic coordination and integration problems generated by large organizational change through a structurally unique, legally mandated division of labor. This division of labor is manifested in the two completely separate core processes that handle CSAR and SOF “production”. SOF production is in the domain of SOCOM’s Strategic Planning Process and CSAR production is in the domain of the Air Force’s Corporate Review Process. In the following sections, brief descriptions of each core process will lead to a discussion of how this division of labor reduces the amount of departmental interdependence to a manageable level, and ultimately provides a level of role alignment highly conducive to CSAR’s long-term effectiveness in AFSOC.

### **a. *The SOCOM “Strategic Planning Process”***

Sticking with the manufacturing and service construct, the SOF assets under AFSOC constitute one of three separate “product lines” funded by SOCOM: Air Force SOF, Army SOF, and Navy SOF. Using the frame of reference of the federal government as SOCOM’s primary customer, one of SOCOM Headquarters’ most important responsibilities is to prioritize its allotted resources between its three product lines. The “Strategic Planning Process” (SPP) is the tool SOCOM Headquarters employs to stay “plugged in” to the overall U.S. national security apparatus while “matching fiscal reality with the mission requirements of SOF” (USSOCOM, 1999, p. 36). The SPP is a four

phase, strategy-to-task methodology “that provides an analytical basis for determining and prioritizing SOF capability needs and optimizing resources to meet those needs” (USSOCOM, 1999, p. 36). The four sequential phases are “Guidance Development”, “Capability Assessment”, “Program Assessment”, and “Integration / Resourcing”.




Figure 5. SOCOM Strategic Planning Process

As depicted in Figure 5, AFSOC has continuous input to the process throughout each of the four phases. However, because of U.S. law regarding military funding (detailed later in this chapter), CSAR issues are completely excluded from consideration in this process. Therefore, only AFSOC's SOF-specific units and programs are served by SOCOM's SPP. In fact, AFSOC has developed its own internal version of the SPP “strategy-to-task” methodology to prioritize its own programs for submission to the SOCOM SPP (HQ AFSOC/XPPX, 2003, p. 5).

### **b. The Air Force “Corporate Review Process”**

Similar to SOCOM, the Air Force resource allocation approach “allows for an open assessment procedure that keeps all participants involved throughout the process” (Fedyszyn et al, 2003, p. A-3-21). With initial top-down guidance, the Air Force program is developed from the bottom, up through successive levels of the corporate structure. Each level is “organized to maximize the effectiveness of cross-functional expertise” (Fedyszyn et al, 2003, p. A-3-21).




Figure 6. Air Force Corporate Review Structure

Figure 6 shows the bottom-up nature of the process. MAJCOM inputs to specific mission area integrated process teams (IPTs) flow upward into the matrix organization of higher level decision makers. This less formal matrix organization, the “Corporate Review Structure”, was formed as an overlay on the Air Force’s formal operating organization in recognition of the fact that “it is

sometimes impossible to obtain consensus through formalized, hierarchical channels on complicated or controversial subjects" (Cooke and Preston, 1975, p. 1). Therefore, the Air Force Corporate Review Structure is optimized to handle key prioritization issues and major funding decisions, such as procuring new weapons systems. Ordinary, day to day operations and sustainment decisions are left to the Air Force's formal operating organization.

Here is how AFSOC works CSAR issues through the Air Force core process. The inter-MAJCOM IPTs at the gateway to the Corporate Review Structure are organized around specific mission areas designated by Air Force senior leadership. AFSOC Headquarters develops and maintains mission area plans (MAPs) aligned with the Air Force-designated mission areas. One of these mission areas is "Personnel Recovery/Recovery Operations (PR/RO)" (HQ AFSOC/XPPX, 2003, p. 5). The PR/RO mission area is CSAR's designated entry point to the Air Force Corporate Review Structure. CSAR issues and concerns are collated in AFSOC Headquarters through internal processes and structures like the HC-130 IPT and the Personnel Recovery Vehicle program team. These issues are presented by AFSOC to the inter-MAJCOM IPT for the PR/RO mission area (as described in the previous chapter, Colonel Smales currently represents AFSOC on this IPT). Inter-MAJCOM coordinated positions from the IPT are then forwarded upward into the Air Force Corporate Review matrix for ultimate approval by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

### **C. EXAMINATION OF DEPARTMENTAL INTERDEPENDENCE IN AFSOC**

Earlier, I used Daft's manufacturing and service construct to help describe how AFSOC's differentiated core processes for SOF and CSAR "production" handle the axiomatic organizational imperative of "differentiation" (division of labor). In this section, I use Thompson's model of departmental interdependence to illustrate how AFSOC's differentiated core processes simplify the other axiomatic organizational imperative of "integration".

Snook (2000) presents three increasing levels of departmental interdependence and their corresponding coordination mechanisms originally developed by James Thompson (p. 152-154). "Pooled" is the lowest, most

simple form of interdependence, and is characterized by different departments rendering discrete contributions to the whole. Departments with pooled interdependence have low requirements for interaction with each other, so coordination within the organization is normally accomplished by standardized rules and procedures (p. 153). “Sequential” is a higher, more complex form of interdependence, and is characterized by tasks that are required to be accomplished in a certain order. Departments with sequential interdependence have moderate requirements for interaction with each other, so coordination is normally accomplished through detailed plans and schedules (p. 153). “Reciprocal” is the highest, most complicated form of interdependence, and is characterized by tasks that relate to each other as both inputs and outputs. Departments with reciprocal interdependence have high requirements for interaction with one another, so coordination is normally accomplished through on-going, real-time mutual adjustment between departments (p. 153).

Individual elements within AFSOC’s internal processes involve various degrees of sequential and reciprocal interdependence. Modernization plans, particular upgrade proposals, and issues jointly affecting CSAR and SOF all have intricate coordinating processes and scheduled deadlines to meet. However, Figure 7 on the following page (an expansion of Figure 4) graphically illustrates that on a macro scale production of AFSOC’s two key finished products, combat-ready CSAR and SOF forces, involves mostly pooled interdependence. Each of AFSOC’s product lines is produced according to standardized rules and procedures within its own core process, and each product line renders its services to a separate customer. Yet both product lines benefit the overall organization. “Each part renders a discrete contribution to the whole and each is supported by the whole” (Snook, 2000, p. 153).




Figure 7. AFSOC Role Alignment and Integration of HHQ Core Processes

This high level of pooled interdependence in AFSOC's key outputs by definition drastically reduces the integrative challenges AFSOC would have faced if CSAR incorporation had occurred under a more sequential or reciprocal structural array. The lower levels of coordination and cooperation required by the “pooled” nature of AFSOC's differentiated core processes severely limits potential friction points and helps overcome the structural, procedural, and cultural “barriers to change” present in every major organizational realignment.

#### D. EXAMINATION OF CSAR AND SOF ROLE ALIGNMENT IN AFSOC

Differentiated core processes and the resultant simplification of departmental interdependence between AFSOC's CSAR and SOF product lines form the core of a decisive and defining structural attribute that favors long-term CSAR effectiveness under AFSOC: superb role alignment. Excellent role

alignment between the CSAR and SOF branches of AFSOC allows integrated synergies in modernization plans, logistics, capabilities development, and TTPs while maintaining the significant organizational benefits inherent in the differentiation of core processes. A closer look at the concept of role alignment and its embodiment in the current AFSOC structure further cements the idea that CSAR is organizationally poised for long-term effectiveness in AFSOC.

### **1. Role Alignment as a Concept**

Good role alignment helps overcome the two most basic structural tensions faced by organizations: division of labor and coordination/control. Division of labor proscribes who is to do what (differentiation). Coordination and control measures proscribe how to keep different parts working towards common goals (integration). Basic structural design must simultaneously answer the questions of how to allocate work and how to coordinate different roles and units once responsibilities have been parceled out (Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 40). For most organizations, “Finding a satisfactory arrangement of roles and relationships is an ongoing, universal struggle” (Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 60). A conspicuous lack of such a “satisfactory arrangement of roles and relationships” has prevented CSAR from ever gaining broad traction, advocacy, and effectiveness within any of its previous parent organizations.

Organizational role alignment requires three steps: role definition, interface, and boundaries. Role definition involves “defining the expected outcome and responsibilities for each of the various organizational roles. “Interface” involves “agreeing on the mutual expectations each role has of the other when handing off work, receiving work, providing service, or collaborating”. “Boundaries” involves clarifying the boundaries between roles, particularly for decision-making and responsibility” (Galbraith, Downey, and Kates, 2002, p. 83).

### **2. Role Alignment in Action**

Based on the above three-step model of role alignment, AFSOC has pulled a “hat trick” in adjusting its organizational structure to assimilate CSAR. In terms of role definition, the AFSOC command briefing on CSAR integration clearly defines separate responsibilities for CSAR and SOF forces. These

responsibilities, pulled from the primary source documents approving and implementing the CSAR transfer, are divided along the lines of task organization and through “operationally and doctrinally distinct lines of command” (HQ AFSOC/DOXJ, 2004, p. 20). As depicted in Figure 7, CSAR forces are task organized to support conventional air operations through OPCON to the JFACC, and SOF are task organized to support theater SOC initiatives through OPCON to the JFSOCC. In the source document approving the CSAR transfer, CSAF Program Action Directive (PAD) 02-09, this clearly defined role relationship between CSAR and SOF in AFSOC is further described as follows:

It is important to note that while ADCON of applicable CSAR forces will transfer to AFSOC, these assets will not belong to USSOCOM but will remain under the operational control of the U.S. Air Force. (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. J-II-2)

In terms of interface, AFSOC Headquarters has integrated 53 CSAR personnel into various critical functions on its staff (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. 4). Throughout the XP and DO directorates, CSAR and SOF staff members collaborate on many common issues, such as modernization plans, logistics, capabilities development, and TTPs. Program Action Directive 02-09, elaborates on the interface issue as follows:

The key benefit to transferring administrative control of select CSAR forces is the synergy achieved by managing comparable forces and missions under one command. This change seizes the opportunity to leverage advances in concepts of operation and emerging technologies by integrating like skills more effectively within the Air Force. (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. J-6)

The cross-cultural HC-130 IPT described in the previous chapter is a prime example of AFSOC Headquarters harnessing its available unique expertise in a flexible way through the direct interface of CSAR and SOF personnel. Because CSAR and SOF “have many core mission similarities with common capabilities and combined training opportunities”, it is precisely these types of direct interfaces through which Secretary Roche and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force hoped to leverage additional advocacy and capability for CSAR forces (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. 2).

In terms of boundaries, in perhaps the most strident example of boundary making possible, funds for CSAR and SOF forces within AFSOC are legally bound to remain “separate and distinct”. In fact, this legal separation of funding is one of the foundational assumptions of the entire CSAR transfer (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. 2). PAD 02-09, and the document implementing the CSAR transfer, AFSOC Programming Plan 03-04, make repeated references to this mandatory separation of funding. Specifically, PAD 02-09 states, “Funding for rescue assets will be separate and distinct from SOF-unique air assets in AFSOC. MFP-11 and MFP-4 funds will not crosswalk” (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. 2, J-II-2). P-Plan 03-04 elaborates, “There will not be a crosswalk of funds between MFP-11 (USSOCOM) and MFP-2/4/5 (USAF). MFP-1 (USAF) DPEM funds designated for SOF aircraft and those designated for CSAR aircraft will not be merged” (HQ AFSOC/XPC, 2003, p. 13). Therefore, “who pays the bills” forms a hard legal boundary and is what defines which one of the previously described core processes AFSOC must work through to deal with any particular issue.

In general organizational terms, “A group’s role system is critical. The right set of task roles helps get the work done and makes optimal use of [the organization’s] resources” (Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 153). For AFSOC in particular, good role alignment, stemming from legally separated funding and differentiated core processes, allows its CSAR and SOF forces to avoid the usual organizational pitfall of internal competition for resources. The type of lopsided development that led to organizational dysfunction and CSAR ineffectiveness in SOF and CSAR’s previous “marriage” in the 1980s (when SOF garnered the lion’s share of resources and equipment at CSAR’s direct expense) is simply not legally possible in AFSOC’s current organizational structure.

## E. CONCLUSION

During my look at the particular structural arrangements and formal processes AFSOC Headquarters employs to address Secretary Roche’s intent of increasing CSAR’s visibility and advocacy within the Air Force, pivotal organizational traits emerged that validate AFSOC’s current approach. Overall,

AFSOC's current structure takes advantage of differentiated core processes, manageable departmental interdependence, and good role alignment to bestow significant organizational benefits on CSAR that currently favor higher-level visibility and advocacy of CSAR issues than at any time since the end of the Vietnam War.

The recent creation of the PR/RO mission area, and the CSAF's subsequent admonition that "all CSAR programs will be vetted through the established AF Corporate Structure and will compete equally with other programs and mission areas", demonstrates the high level of importance that the current Air Force senior leadership places on CSAR capabilities development (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. E-2). Furthermore, in addition to providing the vital designated entry point for CSAR issues into the process, the PR/RO mission area allows high-ranking CSAR advocates direct access to the cross-functional levels of the matrix in the Corporate Review Structure. With the transfer to AFSOC, CSAR now has many more high ranking advocates than ever before, culminating in AFSOC's three-star commander.

This advocacy from AFSOC will likely remain durable because differentiated core processes prevent SOF parochialism from ever gaining a foothold and directly challenging CSAR programs for funding. Because of AFSOC's unique structural array and clear role alignment, advocacy between SOF and CSAR is not a zero-sum game; AFSOC's leadership is free to become aggressive CSAR advocates while posing no monetary or organizational threats to SOF programs.

Coupled with the "CSAR-friendly" organizational culture and decision environment described in the previous chapter, the structural benefits described in this chapter seem to indicate CSAR is poised for long-term, durable effectiveness in AFSOC. The next chapter tests this hypothesis against opinions from current CSAR crewmembers in line flying units who were surveyed nearly one year after their transfer to AFSOC.

## **VI. ORGANIZATIONAL SNAPSHOT: CSAR CREW ATTITUDES AFTER ONE YEAR IN AFSOC**

In this chapter I analyze data collected from a survey of line CSAR aircrew members to help validate the main points I made in Chapters IV and V. I administered the survey one year after CSAR transferred to AFSOC. The survey itself and an explanation of the basis of its construction are contained in Appendix A. The statistical analysis presented in this chapter is derived from Section 3 of the survey. My conclusions in this chapter are further informed by general comments provided by CSAR crewmembers in Section 4 of the survey.

### **A. SURVEY METHOD**

I collected the data used in this chapter over a six week period in August and September 2004 using the survey presented in Figures 8-10 in Appendix A. I made the survey aircrew oriented not as a slight to the pararescue community, but only as a method to “stay in my lane” with a narrow enough focus to keep the length of this project manageable. I intended to sample the entire universe of line CSAR aircrews, but coordination delays with Reserve and Guard chains of command resulted in my receiving primarily an active duty perspective. Nonetheless, the data is sufficient to gain some valuable general insights into active duty CSAR crew attitudes regarding their transfer to AFSOC.

I constructed the survey just prior to an actual research visit to AFSOC Headquarters in July 2004. I shifted the direction of my research as a result of the visit, so the survey ended up capturing a vast amount of information covering broad areas that ended up outside the scope of this study. In the end, I only did deep statistical analysis of data derived from Section 3, “Personal Impressions”. This data is pertinent to help validate the main organizational points I made in Chapters IV and V, and it provides an extremely valuable “reality check” on my overall conclusion that CSAR is poised for long-term effectiveness in AFSOC.

### **B. SURVEY RESULTS**

I received 58 responses to the survey from line CSAR aircrew members. The 43 responses I received from the HH-60 community were split between 33

pilots, 6 aerial gunners, and 4 flight engineers. The 15 responses I received from the HC-130 community were split between 8 pilots, 3 navigators, 2 loadmasters, 1 flight engineer, and 1 radio operator.

The following seven tables summarize the combined responses of all 58 CSAR crewmembers to the seven questions in the “Personal Impressions” section of my CSAR in AFSOC survey. Appendices B and C contain the same analysis broken down by HH-60 and HC-130 crewmembers respectively. The histogram plots the number of individual occurrences of each of the five response choices to the question. Although I included an overlay of the normal distribution curve and a printout of the mean and standard deviation to provide more depth to the data for those who are more “statistically inclined”, I derive my primary analysis in this chapter from the raw data on the histogram. The pie chart converts the raw histogram information into percentages, which allows for easier comparisons to data from other questions.

### 1. Survey Responses “By the Numbers”




Table 1. Survey Section 3, Question #1 Analysis (All Respondents)




Table 2. Survey Section 3, Question #2 Analysis (All Respondents)




Table 3. Survey Section 3, Question #3 Analysis (All Respondents)




Table 4. Survey Section 3, Question #4 Analysis (All Respondents)




Table 5. Survey Section 3, Question #5 Analysis (All Respondents)




Table 6. Survey Section 3, Question #6 Analysis (All Respondents)




Table 7. Survey Section 3, Question #7 Analysis (All Respondents)

## **2. Survey Responses Explored**

My analysis of the survey data identified two major interrelated trends. The first is that CSAR crews hold tremendously positive attitudes towards their transfer to AFSOC. The second is that these positive attitudes are not driven by expectations of personal, individual benefit or by measures of current combat effectiveness; rather they are driven by expectations of the communal benefits to be conferred by better CSAR advocacy and by prospects of future improvements in combat effectiveness.

In regards to CSAR crewmembers' positive attitudes towards their transfer to AFSOC, responses to question 1 reveal broad and deep approval of the transfer. Nearly 83% of respondents expressed affirmative attitudes towards the transfer, with nearly 64% expressing strong positive support. Conversely, less than 9% of respondents expressed negative attitudes towards the transfer, with barely above 3% expressing strongly negative attitudes. In raw numbers, 48 of 58 respondents expressed a positive attitude towards the transfer, 5 were ambivalent, and 5 expressed negative attitudes.

In regards to the motivations behind the predominantly positive attitudes towards the transfer, the results from questions 2 and 5 reveal respondents have taken a generally non-personal view towards the overall benefits of the transfer. Furthermore, the results from questions 3, 6, and 7 reveal respondents have taken a distinct forward-looking, communal orientation towards the benefits to be gained from the transfer.

Despite the overwhelmingly positive general attitude towards the transfer revealed in question 1, responses to question 2 and question 5 both reveal large proportions of ambivalence and negativity. In question 2, fully 62% of respondents thought their prospects for promotion in AFSOC were the same or worse than they were in ACC. Only 21% were convinced their prospects for promotion were significantly better in AFSOC. In question 5, nearly two thirds of respondents (65.5%) felt their personal combat effectiveness was the same or

worse since the transfer. Only 10% thought they were significantly more combat effective since being transferred to AFSOC.

Given the apparent lack of personally oriented enthusiasm for the transfer, we must look at questions 3, 6, and 7 to find the more communally oriented sources of the overwhelmingly positive attitudes expressed towards the transfer in question 1. In question 3, just under 90% of respondents thought AFSOC was providing equal or better advocacy for CSAR issues than ACC did. In fact, fully 60% felt AFSOC's advocacy was superior, with over one third of respondents (35%) feeling strongly so. Only just over 10% felt AFSOC's advocacy of CSAR issues was worse than ACC's.

In questions 6 and 7, respondents revealed that although their units were not currently more combat effective due to the transfer, they overwhelmingly expected their units to become more combat effective over the long term due to the transfer. In question 6, regarding views of current combat effectiveness, nearly two thirds of respondents (65.5%) felt their unit was the same or worse off than it had been in ACC. Less than one fifth (19%) felt their unit was significantly more combat effective since the transfer. However, in question 7, a full 81% of the same respondents felt that "over the long term, my unit will be more combat effective because it was transferred to AFSOC", with more than two out of five (41.4%) feeling strongly so. Conversely, just over 5% thought their unit would be less combat effective over the long term because of the transfer.

## C. CONCLUSION

### 1. CSAR Crews Have Taken a "Long View"

Overall, based on the above statistics it appears most CSAR "crew dogs" feel AFSOC is a better advocate for CSAR and will eventually bring about increased combat effectiveness; they are happy with the transfer and really want it to work. Their positive attitudes towards the transfer persist despite an apparent lack of immediate improvements in personal promotion prospects or personal and unit combat effectiveness. It seems CSAR crews have taken a "long view" towards their prospects for success in AFSOC. Reflecting a practical sense of reality, one respondent hinted at this "long view" when he wrote in

Section 4 of the survey that, “In only one year AFSOC hasn’t had the time to fully address the [deeply rooted] shortcomings of the Rescue community in the tectonically slow acquisitions process”. Many other survey respondents also alluded to this “long view”. The following is a compilation of representative quotes taken from Section 4 of my survey that reflect optimism for CSAR’s long-term prospects in AFSOC:

“I think the future is bright for CSAR and AFSOC. As in any change, there are bumps in the road that have to be navigated and changes in culture/paradigms that take time to work out”...”I think in the long run that the transfer to AFSOC will be a good thing, once the AFSOC staff is educated on our capabilities and potential”...”I think in the long run the move to AFSOC will be beneficial for both the unit and the Air Force”...”I am a supporter of the move. In the long run it will make AFSOC more viable and a better provider of special air warfare capability (including CSAR)”.

## **2. Survey Results Validate My Findings in Chapters IV and V**

The above findings from Sections 3 and 4 of my CSAR in AFSOC survey support and validate the conclusions I proffered in Chapters IV and V. In Chapter IV, I described how a change in organizational culture within AFSOC Headquarters produced a general work environment that eased the organizational friction of CSAR integration and resulted in a general decision environment favorable to addressing CSAR issues. I concluded a general mitigation of traditional clannish parochialism in AFSOC Headquarters produced a “CSAR-friendly” organizational culture and work environment that favors CSAR’s long-term success in the command. The positive attitude among CSAR aircrews reflected throughout the survey results is an “existence proof” of the presence of a “CSAR-friendly” organizational culture in AFSOC.

In Chapter V, I contended that effective organizational constructs within AFSOC Headquarters, especially those regarding resource allocation and higher headquarters (HQ) advocacy, result in good role alignment between AFSOF and CSAR forces. I concluded this minimizes many of the textbook difficulties faced by large organizations undertaking great change, and bestows significant organizational benefits on CSAR that currently favor higher-level visibility and

advocacy of CSAR issues than at any time since the end of the Vietnam War. Survey respondents' general impressions that AFSOC is providing better advocacy for CSAR than ACC did, and that they expect AFSOC will deliver significant improvements in CSAR units' combat effectiveness over the long term, form a considerable block of informed opinion that aligns nicely with my Chapter V conclusions.

Taken together, the "CSAR-friendly" organizational culture and decision environment described in Chapter IV, the structural organizational benefits accruing to CSAR described in Chapter V, and the general levels of current satisfaction and long-term optimism among newly transferred CSAR crews revealed in this chapter all seem to indicate that CSAR is indeed poised for long-term, durable effectiveness in AFSOC. The next and final chapter will present a more detailed summary of my overall argument and will highlight a critical initiative I think is essential for AFSOC's senior leadership to undertake in order to ensure the command's favorable organizational posture is sustained and exploited to real effect in improving CSAR combat capability.

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## VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

### A. OEF AS CSAR'S "DESERT ONE"?

Regardless of rough spots in AFSOF and CSAR's shared organizational past, our nation has now turned to AFSOC to shape an enduringly effective dedicated CSAR force. AFSOC ownership of CSAR brings the AFSOC Commander and his staff to the table as potentially powerful new CSAR advocates. AFSOC's challenge is to ensure that this most recent reorganization of CSAR does not become just the latest in the long historical line of futile attempts at improving Air Force CSAR capability. Hopefully we will be able to look back in five or ten years and see that OEF turned out to be CSAR's "Desert One": a formative failure that eventually drove effective organizational restructuring and dramatic increases in combat capability.

As this thesis is being completed, CSAR forces are forward deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq flying essential combat missions in support of CSAR, humanitarian support, and emergency aeromedical evacuation requirements. Brave crews fly these missions in some of the most challenging terrain and weather conditions ever faced by military aviators. In three years of combat operations in the GWOT, these harsh conditions have taken their toll on men and machines. As Tyner (1996) puts it, "The desire to push the limit is a typical characteristic of a rescuer" (p. 65). In his 1967 book That Others May Live, L.B. Taylor describes rescue as "a basic instinct". He captures the intense, almost primal motivations that pervade rescue units and animate rescue personnel in the following passage:

The history of rescue is as old as the brotherhood of man. No matter what era, area, or circumstance is involved, rescue has always been one of the great human interest stories. Be it a man trapped in a cave, a survivor drifting aimlessly on a raft in the ocean, or a lone pilot lost and injured in the enemy-thick jungles of Vietnam, there is no saga quite as inspiring, as exhilarating, or as dramatic as that of man risking serious injury or death itself to help his fellow man in trouble. Rescue is a compelling, all-encompassing human instinct. In crises people pull together as

never before, often performing deeds far beyond their normal capacities when a life is in the balance. So it has always been and will always be. Such is the nature of man. (US Air Force, 2000, p. III-7)

CSAR forces willingly risk their lives to provide a service that overtly embodies the profound value our nation places on individual human lives while simultaneously serving the practical purpose of preventing damage to U.S. foreign policy by denying enemies the opportunity to exploit isolated personnel. Given this fact, our higher level governmental and military agencies owe dedicated CSAR units the most effective organizational structures and advocacy systems possible. This analysis was devoted to examining CSAR's specific position within AFSOC's organizational array to determine if the 1 October 2003 organizational re-alignment is likely to result in durable improvements in CSAR combat effectiveness. The following section summarizes my overall argument. The final section echoes an initiative from the field that will help ensure AFSOC's favorable organizational posture is sustained and exploited to real effect in improving CSAR combat capability.

## **B. SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS**

For a brief, critical period from 11 September through 8 October 2001, the availability of CSAR capability was a central, defining pivot point for overall U.S. foreign policy. The primacy CSAR issues gained in the opening phase of military action in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan proved that CSAR capability is a vital strategic national resource in its own right. OEF also vividly illustrated the organizational shortcomings of dedicated CSAR forces as they were constituted in Air Combat Command. A realization of these two points by senior Air Force leaders in the wake of the opening salvos of OEF fueled their decision to transfer CSAR forces to AFSOC in 2003.

CSAR has never lacked exceptional people, but various organizational constraints have prevented dedicated CSAR forces from effectively contributing timely capability in three out of our nation's last four major conflicts. Dedicated CSAR forces were not utilized at all in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, nor in the opening phase of Operations Allied Force and Enduring Freedom

(Thompson, 2001, p. 27, 39). In each of these cases, SOF was required to fill the gap in CSAR capability. Only in Operation Iraqi Freedom were CSAR forces initially deployed as designed in a timely manner. However, they soon found themselves improvising around their restrictive, centralized AEF organizational design in order to affect forward deployments in small detachments to airfields deep inside Iraq.

CSAR has had a turbulent organizational history punctuated by four extensive and extremely disruptive reorganization schemes in the last twenty years. In the wake of the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt, an urgent buildup of SOF was accomplished at the direct expense of CSAR forces. This trend continued with the rise of USSOCOM and the creation of AFSOC. CSAR forces were literally devoid of effective combat recovery capability for nearly a whole decade from the early 1980s through the early 1990s until they finally won multiple budgetary battles to field the HH-60G helicopter. In an effort to bolster CSAR's combat capabilities and advocacy structure, control of all USAF CONUS-based dedicated CSAR assets was transferred from ACC to AFSOC on 1 October 2003.

Dramatic changes in AFSOC's task environment in the wake of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks have led the organization to challenge its previous assumptions about the nature of the threats it needs to defeat. This, in turn, has generated profound changes in AFSOC's organizational culture as the institution reorients itself away from short duration, "single hit" scenarios and toward the expansive challenges inherent in the GWOT. A specific lessening of traditional platform-based parochialism in favor of a more capabilities-based approach has resulted in a generally "CSAR-friendly" organizational environment at AFSOC Headquarters.

The particular structural arrangements and formal processes AFSOC Headquarters employs to increase CSAR's visibility and advocacy within the Air Force contain pivotal organizational traits that validate AFSOC's current approach. AFSOC's current structure takes advantage of differentiated core

processes, manageable departmental interdependence, and good role alignment to bestow significant organizational benefits on CSAR that currently favor higher-level visibility and advocacy of CSAR issues than at any time since the end of the Vietnam War. The resource allocation structure in AFSOC includes key avenues for CSAR advocacy that can be exploited by powerful new stakeholders without detriment to AFSOF funding priorities.

Newly-integrated CSAR crewmembers have highly receptive attitudes towards re-alignment under AFSOC. Most CSAR “crew dogs” feel AFSOC is a better advocate for CSAR than ACC, and believe that the transfer will eventually produce increased combat effectiveness in their units. It appears CSAR crews enthusiastically support the transfer for communal rather than personal reasons. They have also taken a practical, realistic, and patient “long view” towards AFSOC’s ability to correct CSAR’s most deeply rooted shortcomings.

Overall, AFSOC’s current organizational array contains a historically unique mix of favorable elements that bode well for the long-term combat effectiveness of CSAR. AFSOC’s “CSAR-friendly” organizational culture, its unique organizational configuration, and the high levels of long-term optimism expressed among its newly-transferred CSAR aircrews all point to the same conclusion: AFSOC’s current organizational construct contains durable cultural, structural, and human resource characteristics that will improve effectiveness in the development and application of CSAR combat capability over the long-term.

## **C. KEY INITIATIVE FOR ENSURING LONG TERM SUCCESS**

Thus, the organizational table is set for CSAR to be successful in AFSOC. The key variable now is the level to which high ranking AFSOC leadership will be effective as enthusiastic CSAR advocates in winning resource battles within the USAF budget process. AFSOC leadership is in a window of opportunity to prove their dedication to CSAR, but CSAR crews’ optimism and “long view” cannot be sustained indefinitely without tangible forward progress. In order to better position the command for sustainable CSAR support, AFSOC’s senior leadership should heed a call from the field and immediately increase CSAR representation on the command staff.

Survey respondents consistently lamented the net loss of MAJCOM-level CSAR staff positions that occurred in the transfer from ACC. They consistently rated “increases in HHQ staff representation” as “critical” for ensuring a sustainable level of advocacy for CSAR in AFSOC. The initial drafts of the transfer proposal I saw in late 2002 and early 2003 while working at AFSOC/DOV showed ACC relinquishing between 78 and 93 headquarters manpower positions to AFSOC in conjunction with the CSAR transfer. The final Program Action Directive signed out of the CSAF’s office stated, “Fifty-three headquarters manpower authorizations will transfer from ACC to AFSOC effective 1 October 2003” (HQ USAF/XOOP, 2003, p. 4). In addition to this drastic manpower cut at the MAJCOM level, CSAR suffered further cuts at higher levels on the Air Staff. One particularly well informed survey respondent, a former rescue squadron commander who is now the Chief of CSAR/SOF Requirements at Air Force Headquarters in the Pentagon, provided some numbers:

On the Air Staff, XOOP [a section dedicated to CSAR issues] was disbanded and its 13-person shop was pared down to 5 and put under XOOS, then only manned to 60%. AF/XPPM had both a SOF and a CSAR programmer, but now they only have one programmer to do both jobs. The workload is the same, and the one guy is deployed, so we now have a KC-135 guy programming for all CSAR/SOF.

An able, forceful, and sufficient staff is where the “rubber meets the road” in terms of advocacy. By swiftly working to correct the huge cuts in HHQ manpower positions suffered by CSAR when it left ACC, AFSOC’s current leaders can prove their bona fides as potent CSAR advocates and will posture AFSOC Headquarters for sustainable CSAR support. This entire study has endeavored to prove that the appropriate organizational machinery is in place to support CSAR’s success in AFSOC. However, that machinery needs to be animated with enough appropriate expertise in the right places in order to translate higher-level advocacy into improved combat capability on the ramp. The clock is ticking.

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## APPENDIX A

### A. CSAR IN AFSOC SURVEY

I collected the data used in Chapter VI over a six week period in August and September 2004 using the survey presented in Figures 8-10 below. I made the survey very aircrew oriented not as a slight to the crucial pararescue community, but only as a method to “stay in my lane” with a narrow enough focus to keep the length of this project manageable. I intended to sample the entire universe of line CSAR aircrews, but coordination delays with Reserve and Guard chains of command resulted in my receiving primarily an active duty perspective.

I received 58 responses to the survey from line CSAR aircrew members: 43 from the HH-60 community and 15 from the HC-130 community. This ratio may have been more balanced had I gotten more Guard and Reserve participation. Nonetheless, the data was sufficient to gain some valuable general insights into active duty CSAR crew attitudes about their transfer to AFSOC.

I constructed the survey just prior to an actual research visit to AFSOC Headquarters in July 2004. I shifted the direction of my research as a result of the visit, so the survey ended up producing a vast amount of information covering broad areas that ended up outside the scope of this study. In the end, I only did extensive analysis of data derived from Section 3, “Personal Impressions”. This data was pertinent to help validate the main organizational points I made in Chapters IV and V, and it provided an extremely valuable “reality check” on my overall conclusion that CSAR is poised for long-term effectiveness in AFSOC.

I designed the survey according to academic principles gleaned from a contemporary social science textbook by Earl Babbie, and from two historical books on consumer and opinion research by Albert Blankenship (Babbie, 1995, p. 131-185) (Blankenship, 1943, p. 43-97) (Blankenship, 1946, p. 222-231). I ensured the survey’s academic viability through consultations with Dr. Erik Jansen, my thesis advisor and an expert on survey research. I ensured the

viability of the survey's content by "pre-testing" it with CSAR experts in AFSOC/DOV and AFSOC/DOXJ prior to its general distribution.

	
<b><u>CSAR in AFSOC SURVEY</u></b>	
16 August 2004	
<b>Please respond by 1 October 2004 by e-mail, phone, or surface mail to:</b>	
Major John Cline Department of Defense Analysis Naval Postgraduate School 589 Dyer Road, Room 210 Monterey, CA 93493	<b><a href="mailto:jcline@nps.navy.mil">jcline@nps.navy.mil</a></b> 831-655-4793 (Home)
Dear AFSOC CSAR aircrew member:	
<p>This short, "e-mail friendly" questionnaire is part of my thesis research at the Naval Postgraduate School. It is in response to a USSOCOM request for ideas on how AFSOC's newly integrated CSAR forces can best serve the JTF Commander. Specifically, I want to assess whether CSAR's recent reorganization under AFSOC is leading to tangible improvements in combat effectiveness, and whether CSAR has finally found a durable "home". I am an MC-130P pilot, and have been deeply involved in CSAR issues during tours in the 58 SOW at Kirtland AFB and at AFSOC/DOV.</p>	
<p>I need your help in developing a snapshot of "where we are" one year after CSAR's transfer to AFSOC from a "rubber meets the ramp" combat aircrew perspective. The bulk of the survey is aimed at producing a prioritized list of the specific hardware, TTPs, and/or organizational changes that would most improve your ability to do your wartime job. My goal is to assess how your responses match up with HHQ CSAR initiatives.</p>	
<p><b>Your responses are extremely important and highly valued.</b> Information you provide here will be integrated directly into my master's thesis with other historical data, and will be forwarded upward through the AFSOC and USSOCOM chains of command.</p>	
<p>Be frank. Distribution of this survey has been coordinated with and approved by HQ AFSOC/DO. Your answers will be kept confidential, and nobody – other than myself – will see these individual survey results.</p>	
<p>Compiled survey results will be available to you as part of my completed thesis by 15 January 2005. Copies will be available on the Naval Postgraduate School library website at <a href="http://library.nps.navy.mil/home">http://library.nps.navy.mil/home</a>. From the Library's main page, search the BOSUN online catalogue's thesis search tab by author's name ("Cline").</p>	
<p>Thanks for your time in this effort to provide a "bottom-up" warfighter's view of how to ensure that CSAR reorganization results in real improvements in combat effectiveness.</p>	

Figure 8. CSAR in AFSOC Survey Page 1

## SECTION 1: DEMOGRAPHICS

Please enter your demographic data in the cells below. Throughout the survey, cells will expand to accept all of your input data.

### General Information:

Airframe	Crew Position	Instructor?	Evaluator?	MDS Hours	Total Hours
Total Years in CSAR?	Total Years in SOF?	Total Years in Air National Guard?	Total Years in Air Force Reserve?	Total Years Active Duty Air Force?	Total Years in Other Services?

Combat / Contingency Experience (type "X" in appropriate columns, provide details in "other"):

OIF?	OEF?	Bosnia?	Kosovo?	OSW?	OPC/ONW?	DESERT STORM?	Other

## SECTION 2A: RATING POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS

Please rate each of the following potential improvements to AFSOC CSAR, with #1, "Critical", being the most sought-after (type "X" in appropriate column for each):

Improvement	Critical 1	Very Important 2	Important 3	Slightly Important 4	Not Important 5
Better Electronic Self Protection Capability (Improved RWR Systems)					
Better Infrared Self Protection Capability (Improved IRWR Systems)					
Better Comm Capability (Better/More Radios)					
Better Night Visual Capability (Better NVGs, IDS)					
Better All Weather Capability (TF/TA radar)					
Better Command & Control Organization					
Better Climate Control (Air/Conditioning/Heat)					
Better Survivor Locator Capability					
Better/more flexible Flight Procedures (Improved Publications and/or TTPs)					
Better Unit Mobility/Self-sufficiency					

Please add and rate specifics for above categories and/or any other general improvements you consider vital to improving CSAR combat effectiveness:

Specific Improvement	Critical 1	Very Important 2	Important 3	Slightly Important 4	Not Important 5

Figure 9. CSAR in AFSOC Survey Page 2

### **SECTION 2B: PRIORITIZING POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS**

Please "copy and paste" your top five choices for improvements from the lists above into the table below (in prioritized order with #1 being the most sought-after).

Improvement	Priority Number
	1
	2
	3
	4
	5

### **SECTION 3: PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS**

Please rate each of the following statements regarding CSAR's transfer to AFSOC.  
(type "X" in appropriate column for each):

Statement	Strongly Agree 1	Slightly Agree 2	Neutral 3	Slightly Disagree 4	Strongly Disagree 5
I am pleased CSAR was transferred to AFSOC.					
My prospects for promotion are better in AFSOC than they were in Air Combat Command.					
AFSOC is providing better advocacy for CSAR issues than Air Combat Command (ACC) did.					
AFSOC is more responsive to the procurement needs of my weapon system than ACC was.					
I am more combat effective since x-fer to AFSOC.					
My unit is more combat effective since in AFSOC.					
Over the long term, my unit will be more combat effective because it was transferred to AFSOC.					

### **SECTION 4: CRITICAL INCIDENTS / GENERAL COMMENTS**

In this section, please provide **UNCLASSIFIED** examples, anecdotes, and/or "war stories" of instances where shortcomings in some of the areas mentioned in Section 2 hindered combat mission effectiveness. Feel free to also provide general comments on CSAR's transfer to AFSOC. (The cell will expand to accept data.) Please be as clear and complete as possible.

It might be helpful for me to be able to follow-up with you to clarify or better understand your points above. Please fill in the following **if and ONLY if** you don't mind me contacting you for further details:

Rank / Name	Unit	E-Mail Address	Home / Work Phone

Once again, thank you for your time and effort.

Figure 10. CSAR in AFSOC Survey Page 3

## APPENDIX B

### A. SUMMARY OF HH-60 CREW ATTITUDES AFTER ONE YEAR IN AFSOC

The following seven panels summarize the responses of 43 HH-60 crewmembers to the seven questions in the “Personal Impressions” section of my CSAR in AFSOC survey. By crew position, the 43 respondents consisted of 33 pilots, 6 aerial gunners, and 4 flight engineers. The histogram plots the number of individual occurrences of each of the five response choices to the question. For more “statistically inclined” readers, I included an overlay of the normal distribution curve and a printout of the mean and standard deviation. The pie chart converts the histogram information into percentages to allow for easier comparisons to data from other questions.

The biggest surprise I found in the HH-60 data was an across-the-board lack of strong negative feelings about being transferred to AFSOC. Conventional wisdom suggested rotary-wing crews would be more negative about the transfer.




Table 8. Survey Section 3, Question #1 Analysis (HH-60 Crewmembers)




Table 9. Survey Section 3, Question #2 Analysis (HH-60 Crewmembers)




Table 10. Survey Section 3, Question #3 Analysis (HH-60 Crewmembers)

**"AFSOC is more responsive to the procurement needs of my MDS than ACC" (HH-60 Crewmembers)**




Table 11. Survey Section 3, Question #4 Analysis (HH-60 Crewmembers)

**"I am more combat effective since transferred to AFSOC" (HH-60 Crewmembers)**




Table 12. Survey Section 3, Question #5 Analysis (HH-60 Crewmembers)




Table 13. Survey Section 3, Question #6 Analysis (HH-60 Crewmembers)




Table 14. Survey Section 3, Question #7 Analysis (HH-60 Crewmembers)

## APPENDIX C

### A. SUMMARY OF HC-130 CREW ATTITUDES AFTER ONE YEAR IN AFSOC

The following seven panels summarize the responses of 15 HC-130 crewmembers to the seven questions in the “Personal Impressions” section of my CSAR in AFSOC survey. By crew position, the 15 respondents consisted of 8 pilots, 3 navigators, 2 loadmasters, 1 flight engineer, and 1 radio operator. The histogram plots the number of individual occurrences of each of the five response choices to the question. For more “statistically inclined” readers, I included an overlay of the normal distribution curve and a printout of the mean and standard deviation. The pie chart converts the histogram information into percentages to allow for easier comparisons to data from other questions.

I did not find any surprises in the HC-130 data. Conventional wisdom held that HC-130 crews would have strong positive feelings about being transferred to AFSOC because they would be in a command where flying a C-130 was valued.




Table 15. Survey Section 3, Question #1 Analysis (HC-130 Crewmembers)




Table 16. Survey Section 3, Question #2 Analysis (HC-130 Crewmembers)




Table 17. Survey Section 3, Question #3 Analysis (HC-130 Crewmembers)

**"AFSOC is more responsive to the procurement needs of my MDS than ACC" (HC-130 Crewmembers)**




Table 18. Survey Section 3, Question #4 Analysis (HC-130 Crewmembers)

**"I am more combat effective since transferred to AFSOC" (HC-130 Crewmembers)**




Table 19. Survey Section 3, Question #5 Analysis (HC-130 Crewmembers)




Table 20. Survey Section 3, Question #6 Analysis (HC-130 Crewmembers)




Table 21. Survey Section 3, Question #7 Analysis (HC-130 Crewmembers)

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